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Abstract
This thesis studies the e ect of repeated and long term relationships between
actors engaged in economic markets. Firms hire workers for long periods and
o er contracts that evolve over time, and where the history shared with the
worker might a ect future payments. This thesis shows that understanding the
nature and implications of such relationships is central to correctly measure
the realized allocation in the market and predict the e ects of changes in
labour policies.
The opening chapter is a theoretical contribution to the repeated games
literature. It demonstrates how di erences in time preferences between players
can be used to sustain equilibrium payo s that are unattainable under identical
discount parameters. This reveals how rich inter-temporal strategies can be
utilized to sustain improbable transfers between individuals.
The second chapter embeds such a relationship inside an equilibrium where
actors randomly meet with each other. It contributes to the literature on
labour markets with friction by demonstrating how widely available matched
employer-employee data can be used to recover the production function in the
economy as well as the assignment of workers to firms. This has important
implications for the e ectiveness of policies aiming at reallocating workers to
more productive jobs.
In the final chapter, workers are risk averse and productivity is uncertain.
I show that in this context firms choose to o er partial insurance contracts
to their workers. The repeated interactions between the firm and the worker
are fundamental to understanding how employers choose to transmit part of
the uncertainty to the workers. I estimate the model on Swedish data and
evaluate the e ects of a hypothetical progressive tax aimed at reducing income
inequality and uncertainty. The exercise reveals that firms will respond to the
policy by transferring more risk to the employees negating around 30% of the
direct e ect of the policy.
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Introduction
Many markets are characterized by long term relationships between actors:
Firms hire workers for long periods of time and it is common for them to o er
contracts with “stock options” and vesting periods, contracts indexed on per-
formance, or even to commit to career advancements; Big retailers try to lock
customers in with fidelity programs; In markets for life-insurance, monthly
payments have to reflect past, current and expected future customer health
condition, and companies o er very complicated dynamic prices. Understand-
ing such pricing mechanisms, and how they a ect the allocation of resources,
involves analyzing both the process that brings actors together in the market,
as well as the strategic interactions between these actors. In this thesis, I
develop methods to address these questions both theoretically and empirically
and apply these novel methods to labour markets.
The first chapter, published in Games and Economic Behavior with Yves
Guéron and Caroline Thomas, is a theoretical contribution to the repeated
games literature. The paper demonstrates how in a repeated game, di er-
ences in time preferences between players can be used to sustain equilibrium
payo s that are unattainable under identical discount parameters. Relatively
patient players can make credible punishment threats to less patient players
that consist of back-loading pay-o s. We show how this type of punishment
strategy can be used to sustain otherwise unreachable payo s. This allows us
to relax the usual full dimension assumption necessary for the folk theorem to
apply. This paper reveals how rich inter-temporal strategies can be used to
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sustain improbable transfers between individuals. Methods and results from
the repeated game literature have important implications for the study of large
markets, as shown in the following chapters.
In my second chapter, co-authored with Jeremy Lise, Costas Meghir and
Jean-Marc Robin, we address the question of how workers are assigned to
firms in the economy and how search frictions constrain this assignment. We
develop a model with two-sided heterogeneity, production complementarities
and a contract setting where workers’ wages are determined by their produc-
tivity, the productivity of their employers and also their employment histories.
The wage paid to a worker at a given point is a sub-game perfect equilibrium
of a game played between the firm and the worker. The long term relationship
between firm and worker and the repetitive nature of these interactions are
central to understanding the price dispersion observed in the data, particularly
among similar workers, even in similar firms. We provide a constructive iden-
tification proof of how wage data, firm size and co-worker information can be
used to non- parametrically recover the production function, the assignment
distribution over unobserved worker and firm types, as well as the cost to firms
of creating new jobs. This paper is an important contribution to our knowl-
edge about both the empirical content of matched employer-employee data
and how well models with long-term contracts perform at matching observed
wage and employment dynamics.
In the final chapter I examine the sources of earning uncertainty faced by
workers in the labour market. The data tells us that a portion of earnings
uncertainty is shared by co-workers at the firm level and that job losses and
transitions are important sources of earning variation. In order to understand
how productivity shocks are transmitted into earning and employment un-
certainty, I develop an equilibrium model with search frictions, worker risk
aversion and worker and firm shocks. In the model, firms optimally choose
how the wage contract transmits productivity shocks to wages. I show theo-
retically that the presence of rents due to search frictions, together with the
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incentive problem due to workers’ private search, result in an optimal con-
tract that smoothly tracks underlying productivity. The repeated interactions
between firm and worker are fundamental to understanding how employers
choose to transmit part of the uncertainty to the workers. This represents
a departure from perfectly competitive markets since worker shocks are only
partially transmitted and workers are not fully shielded from firm shocks. I
estimate the model with matched employer-employee data from Sweden. Us-
ing information about earnings shocks shared by co-workers, I am able to
disentangle firm-specific and worker- specific shocks. Preliminary estimates
suggest that firm level shocks are responsible for about 20% of permanent in-
come fluctuations; the remaining fluctuations are accounted for by individual
level shocks (30% to 40%) and job mobility (40% to 50%). Pass-through esti-
mates reveal that the wage contract attenuates 80% of individual productivity
shocks but transmits 30% of firm productivity fluctuations. Moreover, the
model can be used to evaluate the e ect of labour policies. In the paper, I
look at the e ects of a hypothetical progressive tax aimed at reducing income
inequality and uncertainty. The exercise reveals that firms will respond to the
policy by transferring more risk to the workers. In equilibrium, 30% of the
direct e ect of the policy is negated out by firms responding by posting riskier
wage contracts.
The first chapter looks theoretically at the repeated interactions between
actors, and contributes to our understanding about the kinds of equilibrium
relationships that can be sustained over long term strategic interactions. The
second chapter embeds a sub-game perfect equilibrium inside an equilibrium
where actors randomly meet with each other. In the paper, we develop in
detail how data can be used to recover the parameters of the model. In the
final chapter, workers are risk averse and productivity is uncertain. I show
that in this context firms choose to o er partial insurance contracts to their
workers. I hope that the findings presented in the thesis will help future
research better understand price formation in frictional labour markets, but
also in other markets where long term relationships are an important feature
of the data, such as insurance markets, financial markets and goods market.
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Chapter 1
Repeated Games with
One-Dimensional Payo s and
Di erent Discount factors
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Chapter 1. Di erent time preferences 1.1. Introduction
This chapter is based on joint work with Yves Gueron and Caroline Thomas.
1.1 Introduction
For the folk theorem to hold with more than two players, it is necessary to
have the ability to threaten any single player with a low payo , while also
o ering rewards to the punishing players. In assuming full dimensionality of
the convex hull of the set of feasible stage-game payo s, Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986) guarantee that those individual punishments and rewards exist. Abreu,
Dutta, and Smith (1994) show that the weaker NEU condition (“nonequivalent
utilities”), whereby no two players have identical preferences in the stage-game,
is su cient for the folk theorem to hold.
When the NEU condition fails, players that have equivalent utilities can
no longer be individually punished in equilibrium. Wen (1994) introduces
the notion of e ective minmax payo , which takes into account the fact that
when a player is being minmaxed, another player with equivalent utility might
unilaterally deviate and best respond. The e ective minmax payo  of a player
cannot be lower than his individual minmax payo  (when NEU is satisfied,
they coincide), and Wen shows that when NEU fails it is the e ective minmax
that constitutes the lower bound on subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s. He
establishes the following folk theorem: when players are su ciently patient,
any feasible payo  vector can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
provided it dominates the e ective minmax payo  vector. We show that this
can be relaxed by allowing for unequal discounting.
As pointed out by Lehrer and Pauzner (1999), when players have di erent
discount factors, the set of feasible payo s in a two-player repeated game is
L R
T 3,1 0,0
B 0,0 1,3
Figure 1.1: Battle of the sexes
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typically larger and of higher dimensionality than the set of feasible stage-
game payo s.1 In a particular three-player game in which two players have
equivalent utilities, Chen (2008) illustrates how with unequal discounting pay-
o s below the e ective minmax may indeed be achieved in equilibrium for one
of the players.
In this chapter, we explore the notion that unequal discounting restores
the ability to punish players individually in an n-player game where all players
have equivalent utilities. Our result is stronger than Chen’s as we show that
all players can be hold down to their individual minmax payo  in equilibrium.
Moreover we argue that our result holds for all possible violations of NEU.
We find that a small di erence in the discount factors su ces to hold a player
to his individual minmax for a certain number of periods while still being
able to reward the punishing players. For discount factors su ciently close to
one, any strictly individually rational payo , including those dominated by the
e ective minmax payo , can be obtained as the outcome of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium with public correlation, restoring the validity of the folk theorem.
Although our result is stated for games where all players have equivalent
utilities, we conjecture that it extends to weaker violations of NEU, as long as
any two players with equivalent utilities have di erent discount factor. The
intuition behind this conjecture is that following Abreu, Dutta, and Smith
(1994) we could design specific punishments for each group of players with
equivalent utilities and use the di erence in discount factors within each group
to enforce those specific punishments.
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L R L R
T 1,1,1 0,0,0 T 0,0,0 0,0,0
B 0,0,0 0,0,0 B 0,0,0 1,1,1
C D
Figure 1.2: A stage game with one-dimensional payo s
1.1.1 An Example
Consider the stage-game in Figure 1.2, where Player 1 chooses rows, Player 2
columns and Player 3 matrices. This stage-game is infinitely repeated and the
players evaluate payo  streams according to the discounting criterion. When
the players share a common discount factor ” < 1, Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986, Example 3) show that any subgame-perfect equilibrium yields a payo 
of at least 1/4 (the e ective minmax) to each player, whereas the individual
minmax payo  of each player is zero.2 The low dimensionality of the set of
stage-game payo s weakens the punishment that can be imposed on a player
as another player with equivalent utility can deviate and best respond. The
inability to achieve subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s in (0, 1/4) means that
the “standard” folk theorem fails in this case.3
We show however that if all three players have di erent discount factors,
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the payo  to each player
is arbitrarily close to zero, the individual minmax, provided that the discount
factors are su ciently close to one. Any payo  in the interval (0, 1/4) can
then be achieved in equilibrium, restoring the validity of the folk theorem in
the context of this game.
1Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Remark 2.1.4) present a simple example to show how the
set of feasible payo s can increase when allowing for di erent discount factors. Consider the
game of battle of the sexes depicted in Figure 1.1 and assume that players have di erent
discount factors, ”1 > ”2. Consider an outcome in which (B,R) is played for T periods while
(T, L) is played in subsequent periods. That is, first the less patient player is favored while
the more patient player is rewarded subsequently. The playo s to player 1 and 2 from this
outcome are (1≠ ”T1 ) + 3”T1 and 3(1≠ ”T2 ) + ”T2 , which is outside the convex hull of the set
{(3, 1), (0, 0), (1, 3)} because ”1 > ”2.
2For example, when Player 1 plays T and Player 2 plays R, Player 3 gets a payo  of 0
whether he plays C or D.
3One may not be too concerned about our inability to achieve low payo s. However if
the game of Figure 1.2 is part of a more general game then our inability to reach low payo s
(that is, to punish players) might reduce the scope for cooperation in the more general game.
14
Chapter 1. Di erent time preferences 1.1. Introduction
1.1.2 Notation
We consider an n-player repeated game, where all players have equivalent
utilities. We normalize payo s to be in {0, 1} and let each player’s individual
minmax payo  be zero.4 We use public correlation to convexify the payo  set,
although we argue later that this assumption can be dispensed with. Players
have di erent discount factors, and are ordered according to their patience
level: 0 < ”1 < · · · < ”n≠1 < ”n < 1.5 We use an exponential representation
of discount factors: ’ i, ”i := e≠ ﬂi , where   > 0 could represent the length
of time between two repetitions of the stage game. As   æ 0, all discount
factors tend to one. The ﬂ’s are strictly ordered: 0 < ﬂn < · · · < ﬂ2 < ﬂ1. We
assume that the stage game has a (mixed) Nash equilibrium which yields a
payo  Q < 1 to all players.6
We summarize our assumptions about the game and introduce a notation
for the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo  of a player i in the following
definitions:
Definition 1. Let   ( ) be the set of n-player infinitely repeated games such
that:
(i) The set of stage-game payo s is one-dimensional and all players receive
the same payo  in {0, 1}.
(ii) The stage game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium which yields a
payo  of Q < 1 to all players.
(iii) Each player’s pure action individual minmax payo  is zero.
(iv) Players evaluate payo  streams according to the discounting criterion,
and discount factors are strictly ordered: 0 < ”1 < · · · < ”n < 1, where
”i := e≠ ﬂi.
4We only use two payo s as we only need to consider the minmax payo  and the maximum
possible payo .
5Note that the result no longer holds if several but not all players have the same discount
factor. We address this point in Section 1.A.
6For example in the game of Figure 1.2, the mixture
Ó
(1/2, 1/2) , (1/2, 1/2) , (1/2, 1/2)
Ô
is a Nash equilibrium that yields a payo  of 1/4.
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Note that the stage game of Figure 1.2 satisfies assumptions A(i) to A(iii)
of Definition 1.
Definition 2. We denote by ai the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo 
of Player i in a game G  œ   ( ).
For given discount factors, the existence of the (ai)i=1,...,n is ensured by the
compactness of the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s (see Fudenberg
and Levine (1983, Lemma 4.2)).
1.1.3 Main Result and Outline of the Proof
Our main result, Theorem 1, states that for games in   ( ), the lowest subgame-
perfect equilibrium payo  of each player goes to zero (the common individual
minmax payo ) as discount factors tend to one:
Theorem 1. Consider an n-player infinitely repeated game G  œ   ( ). Then
ai œ O ( ) for all i.7
Theorem 1 states that for discount factors su ciently close to one (that is
for   su ciently close to zero), the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium pay-
o  of each player i, ai, is arbitrarily close to zero. We do not provide a full
characterization of the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s but note
that any feasible and strictly individually rational payo  is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium payo . In recent work, Sugaya (2010) characterises the set of
perfect and public equilibrium payo s in games with imperfect public moni-
toring when players have di erent discount factors, under a full-dimensionality
assumption.
To prove Theorem 1, we first show that when stage-game payo s are iden-
tical, the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s are ordered according
to the discount factors (Lemma 1). A player’s lowest subgame-perfect equi-
librium payo  cannot be below that of another player who is less patient.
We then show that the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s of the two
7That is, ÷M Ø 0 and  ú > 0 such that ai ÆM ·  for   Æ  ú.
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most patient players (Player n≠ 1 and Player n) are arbitrarily close to each
other when discount factors tend to one (Lemma 2). This is done by explicitly
constructing a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
In a similar way, we then construct a set of subgame-perfect equilibria
(one for each player i œ {2, . . . , n≠ 1}) (Lemma 3) and use those to bound
the distance between the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s of players
i and i≠ 1 (Lemma 4). We then show by induction that the lowest subgame-
perfect equilibrium payo s of any two players are arbitrarily close to each
other as discount factors tend to one (Lemma 5). Finally we show that Player
1’s lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo  can be made arbitrarily close to
zero as discount factors tend to one (Lemma 6). We are then able to conclude
and prove Theorem 1.
Note that the assumption of strictly di erent discount factors cannot be
dispensed with. In particular our result does not hold when some but not all
player share a common discount factor. In a similar fashion to Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986, Example 3), we construct a four-player example where the stage
game satisfies assumptions A(i) to A(iii) but where the two “intermediate”
players share a common discount factor. That is we have ”1 < ”2 = ”3 < ”4.
This example is presented in Section 1.A.
1.2 Lowest Equilibrium Payo s
1.2.1 Strategy Profiles and Incentive Compatibility Constraints
To prove Theorem 1, we explicitly construct several subgame-perfect equilib-
ria of the repeated game. To do so, we consider strategy profiles that give
a constant expected stage-game payo  between zero and one (using public
correlation) to all players for a given number of periods, and then stage-game
payo s of one forever:
Definition 3. Let ‡(µ, ·, i) be the strategy profile such that:
(i) For · periods, in each stage-game, players use a public correlating device
17
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to generate an expected payo  of µ. When the public correlating device
generates a payo  of zero, players minmax Player i.
(ii) In all subsequent periods t > · , players play an action profile yielding a
stage-game payo  of 1 to each player.
(iii) During the first · periods, deviations by Player i are ignored. After that,
if Player i deviates from the equilibrium path, players play a subgame-
perfect equilibrium which gives Player i his lowest possible payo , ai.
(iv) If a deviation by Player j ”= i occurs at any time, players then play
a subgame-perfect equilibrium which gives Player j his lowest possible
payo , aj.
Assuming that the correlating device generates a payo  of zero at t = 0, a
player j ”= i will not have an incentive to deviate from ‡(µ, ·, i) if:8,9
(1≠ ”j) + ”jaj Æ ”j
1
(1≠ ”·≠1j )µ+ ”·≠1j
2
, (1.1)
which can be rewritten as
”·j Ø
1≠ ”j + ”jaj ≠ ”jµ
1≠ µ . (1.2)
To prove Theorem 1, we show that there exists a “low” µ and a large · such
that for   su ciently close to zero, the strategy profile ‡(µ, ·, i) is subgame
perfect, that is, we show that (1.2) is satisfied for any j ”= i. To do so, we
identify the player with the tightest incentive compatibility constraint as júi
and find the largest · such that (1.2) is satisfied for Player júi (Lemma 3).
Notice that Player júi is not necessarily the player with the lowest discount
factor. By a “low” µ we mean that µ must be close to ai≠1. To this end, we
8First note that zero is the lowest possible stage game payo  and so if it is enforceable all
other payo s will be. Second the strategy starts by giving zeros and ones and then rewards
the players with ones forever, so the tightest incentive compatibility constraint will be when
t = 0 as for t > 0 players are closer to getting ones for ever.
9The left-hand side of (1.1) is the payo  to Player j if he deviates: he get an instantaneous
payo  of 1 followed by a repeated game payo  of aj . If Player j follows the strategy he gets
a payo  of zero today, followed by · ≠ 1 periods during which he gets an expected payo  of
µ, after which he receives a payo  of one in each period.
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choose a stage-game payo  µi that is slightly above ai≠1:
Definition 4. For all i œ {1, ..., n}, let µi be such that:10
µi =
Y__]__[
ai≠1 + 1≠”1”1 if 2 Æ i Æ n,
0 if i = 1.
To illustrate, consider a player i with intermediate patience, such that
1 < i < n. The strategy profile ‡(µ, ·, i) does not give him an opportunity to
deviate, as he is being minmaxed when payo s of zero are generated. For this
reason, that strategy profile can be thought of as the other players colluding
against player i. Lowering the payo  to player i from that strategy profile may
conflict with making it incentive compatible both for players that are more and
less patient than him. Players less patient than i must get a payo  su ciently
higher than their lowest SPE payo , and players more patient than i must be
promised payo s of 1 soon enough to make them accept an early stream of
low payo s. We show that these constraints can be reconciled with keeping
player i’s payo  very close to the lowest equilibrium payo  of the player just
less patient than him.
1.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In a first step towards Theorem 1 we now show that the lowest subgame-perfect
equilibrium payo s are ordered according to the discount factors (Lemma 1),
and that Player n’s lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo  is arbitrarily
close to Player n≠ 1’s for   close enough to zero (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. ’i œ {2, . . . , n}, ai≠1 Æ ai.
Proof. The main idea is to find a stream of payo s (zt)t=0,...,Œ in [0, 1]N that
minimizes Player i’s average discounted payo , given Player i≠1 is guaranteed
his lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo  at each stage. By definition, the
10Note that for all i and for   su ciently close to zero, µi Æ 1. Indeed, µi Æ Q +
1≠”1
”1
æ æ0 Q < 1.
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resulting average discounted payo  for Player i cannot be greater than ai. We
show that the constraints imposed by Player i ≠ 1’s lowest subgame-perfect
equilibrium payo  must all be binding and that zt = ai≠1, ’t Ø 0.
Formally, we solve the following minimization problem:
min
(zt)t=0,...,Œœ[0,1]N
(1≠ ”i)
Œÿ
t=0
”ti zt (1.3)
subject to
(1≠ ”i≠1)
Œÿ
t=s
”t≠si≠1 zt Ø ai≠1, ’s Ø 0 (1.4)
We show by induction that all constraints in (1.4) will be binding, which
implies that zs = ai≠1, ’s Ø 0. Our induction hypothesis is that the con-
straints in (1.4) must bind for s = 0, . . . , · and therefore, that the minimiza-
tion problem (1.3) subject to the constraints (1.4) can be rewritten as:
min
(zt)t=·,...,Œœ[0,1]N
⁄·≠1 (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) + (1≠ ”i)
A Œÿ
t=·+1
”·i
1
”t≠·i ≠ ”t≠·i≠1
2
zt
B
(1.5)
subject to
(1≠ ”i≠1)
Œÿ
t=s
”t≠si≠1 zt Ø ai≠1, ’s Ø · + 1 (1.6)
where the function ⁄· is recursively defined by
⁄0 (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) = (1≠ ”i) ai≠11≠ ”i≠1
and
⁄· (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) = ⁄·≠1 (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) + (1≠ ”i) ”·i + (”i ≠ ”i≠1)
ai≠1
1≠ ”i≠1 .
Initialization: · = 0 The first constraint is the only constraint fea-
turing z0 and can be rewritten as z0 Ø ai≠11≠”i≠1 ≠
qŒ
t=1 ”
t
i≠1 zt. Moreover, z0
enters with a positive coe cient in the objective function, therefore, the first
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constraint must be binding. The constraint is then used to eliminate z0 from
the objective function: the minimization problem (1.3) subject to (1.4) can
therefore be written in the following way:
min
(zt)t=1,...,Œœ[0,1]N
(1≠ ”i)
A
ai≠1
1≠ ”i≠1 +
Œÿ
t=1
1
”ti ≠ ”ti≠1
2
zt
B
subject to
(1≠ ”i≠1)
Œÿ
t=s
”t≠si≠1 zt Ø ai≠1, ’s Ø 1
This verifies (1.5) and (1.6).
Induction We assume that our minimization problem can be rewritten
as (1.5) subject to (1.6) for some · > 1. Because ”i > ”i≠1, z·+1 enters with
a positive coe cient in the objective function and z·+1 only appears in the
constraint z·+1 Ø ai≠11≠”i≠1 ≠
qŒ
t=·+2 ”
t≠(·+1)
i≠1 zt, this constraint will be binding
and the objective function can be rewritten by substituting for z·+1 as follows:
⁄·≠1 (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) + (1≠ ”i)
A Œÿ
t=·+1
”·i
1
”t≠·i ≠ ”t≠·i≠1
2
zt
B
= ⁄·≠1 (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) + (1≠ ”i)
A
”·i (”i ≠ ”i≠1)
A
ai≠1
1≠ ”i≠1 ≠
Œÿ
t=·+2
”t≠(·+1)i≠1 zt
BB
+ (1≠ ”i)
Œÿ
t=·+2
”·i
1
”t≠·i ≠ ”t≠·i≠1
2
zt
= ⁄· (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) + (1≠ ”i)
Œÿ
t=·+2
1
”·i
1
”t≠·i ≠ ”t≠·i≠1
2
≠ ”·i (”i ≠ ”i≠1) ”t≠(·+1)i≠1
2
zt
= ⁄· (ai≠1, ”i≠1, ”i) + (1≠ ”i)
A Œÿ
t=·+2
”·+1i
1
”t≠(·+1)i ≠ ”t≠(·+1)i≠1
2
zt
B
,
where the first equality is obtained by substituting for z·+1 and the other
equalities are obtained by grouping the terms in zt (t Ø · +2) together. Thus
(1.5) and (1.6) hold for · + 1 also.
This concludes the proof by induction and so all constraints in (1.4) must
bind: (1 ≠ ”i≠1)qŒt=s ”t≠si≠1 zt = ai≠1, ’s Ø 0. We now show that this implies
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that zs = ai≠1, ’s Ø 0. Consider the constraint for some s Ø 0:
ai≠1 = (1≠ ”i≠1)
Œÿ
t=s
”t≠si≠1 zt
= (1≠ ”i≠1)
I
zs + ”i≠1
Œÿ
t=s+1
”t≠(s+1)i≠1 zt
J
= (1≠ ”i≠1)
;
zs +
”i≠1
1≠ ”i≠1 ai≠1
<
,
where the last inequality holds because the constraint is binding for s + 1.
This implies that zs = ai≠1, ’s Ø 0.
Given the constraints imposed on stage-game payo s by player i ≠ 1’s
lower subgame-perfect equilibrium bound, the lowest average discounted payo 
which can be given to player i is ai≠1. We therefore have ai≠1 Æ ai.
Lemma 2. |an ≠ an≠1| œ O ( ).
Proof. Consider the strategy profile ‡(µn,Œ, n), where µn = an≠1+ 1≠”1”1 . We
are going to show that this constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
First, note that in a period in which the public correlating device gener-
ates a payo  of one, no player has a one-shot profitable deviation. Secondly,
because Player n is being minmaxed in a period in which the public corre-
lating device generates a payo  of zero, he doesn’t have a profitable one-shot
deviation. Thirdly, because punishment phases consist of subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategies, no player has a profitable one-shot deviation during
one of those. Thus, to verify that ‡(µn,Œ, n) is subgame perfect, we only
need to check that players i Æ n≠1 do not have profitable one-shot deviations
when the public correlating device generates a payo  of zero.
A deviation from Player i Æ n ≠ 1 leads at most to a one-o  gain of one
followed by a payo  of ai forever. Therefore, there is no one-shot profitable
deviation if (1≠ ”i)+ ”iai Æ ”i
1
an≠1 + 1≠”1”1
2
, where the right-hand-side is the
repeated game payo  to Player i if the public correlation device indicates a
zero payo  action profile in that period. This inequality is always satisfied for
i Æ n≠ 1 as ai Æ an≠1 (Lemma 1) and as 1≠”i”i Æ 1≠”1”1 .
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By definition of an, and by Lemma 1, we have that an≠1 Æ an Æ an≠1 +
1≠”1
”1
. We conclude the proof by noting that an ≠ an≠1 Æ 1≠”1”1 and that
1≠”1
”1
œ O ( ).
We have shown that the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s of
the two most patient players are arbitrarily close as   tends to zero. The
intuition behind this result is that all players can collude against Player n by
minmaxing him whenever the public correlating device generates a payo  of
zero. Since Player n≠ 1 is the most patient of the colluding players and since
lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s are ordered according to discount
factors, his lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium will determine by how much
Player n’s equilibrium payo  can be pushed down.
We now show that the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s of any
two players are arbitrarily close to each other as   tends to zero (Lemma
5). We start by identifying bounds on Player i > 1’s lowest subgame-perfect
equilibrium payo . To do this, we find the largest time · Ø 1 such that the
strategy profile ‡(µi, ·, i) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium and compute its
equilibrium payo  for Player i. We then prove Lemma 5 by induction.
First, we introduce some useful notation. For every player i œ {1, . . . , n≠ 1},
define
N i+ := {j > i : 1≠ ”j + ”jaj ≠ ”jµi > 0} .
When proving that for a particular · , ‡(µi, ·, i) is a subgame-perfect equi-
librium, N i+ should be thought of as the set of players for whom profitable
deviations might exist depending on the value of · . That is, N i+ is the set of
players for whom the right-hand side of (1.2) (when replacing µ with µi) is
strictly positive. We will therefore choose · to satisfy the no-deviation con-
straints of all players in N i+. When N i+ is not empty, we identify the player
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from this set with the tightest constraint as júi and we define Âti as follows:
júi := arg min
jœN i+
log
3
(1≠ ”j + ”jaj ≠ ”jµi) / (1≠ µi)
4
log ”j
,
Âti := log
31
1≠ ”júi + ”júi ajúi ≠ ”júi µi
2
/ (1≠ µi)
4
log ”júi
.
Let túi :=
ÍÂtiÎ be the largest integer smaller or equal than Âti and define ri œ
(0, 1) to be the fractional part of Âti:
ri := Âti ≠ túi .
Note that túi is the longest time · such that júi does not have a profitable
one-shot deviation in ‡(µi, ·, i).
In Lemma 3 we show that for   su ciently close to zero túi is well defined
and arbitrarily large and that the strategy profile ‡(µi, túi , i) is indeed subgame
perfect.
Lemma 3. Let i œ {2, ..., n ≠ 1}, and assume that N i+ ”= ÿ. Given júi , túi
and µi, ÷ úi > 0 such that for   œ (0, úi ), ‡(µi, túi , i) constitutes a subgame-
perfect equilibrium.
Proof. For notational convenience, we omit the i subscript on júi , Âti, túi , and
ri. First, recall that for   su ciently close to zero, µi Æ 1.11 We now check
that tú is well defined. Note that ÷ ij > 0 and ÷ij < 1 such that for   Æ  ij ,
1≠”j+”jaj≠”jµi
1≠µi < ÷ij .
12 Because ÷ij does not depend on  , this shows that
lim æ0 Ât = Œ and ensures that ÷ úi > 0 such that tú is well defined and
strictly positive for   œ (0, úi ).
Because i is being minmaxed if the public correlating device generates
a payo  of zero, i does not have a profitable one-shot deviation. Also, no
11See footnote 10.
12Since aj Æ Q, 1≠”j+”jaj≠”jµi1≠µi Æ ”j
Q≠µi
1≠µi +
1≠”j
1≠Q≠(1≠”1)/”1 . For any x in [0, 1),
Q≠x
1≠x Æ
Q, thus the right-hand-side of the previous inequality is bounded from above by ”jQ +
1≠”j
1≠Q≠(1≠”1)/”1 , which tends to Q < 1 as   tends to zero.
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player will have a profitable one-shot deviation during the punishment phases
of ‡(µi, túi , i), as those are subgame perfect.
We now check that no player j ”= i has a profitable one-shot deviation,
that is, we check that (1.1) (when replacing µ with µi and · with tú) holds for
all players j ”= i:
(1≠ ”j) + ”jaj Æ ”j
1
(1≠ ”tú≠1j )µi + ”t
ú≠1
j
2
. (1.7)
We first check that (1.7) holds for players j Æ i≠ 1 and then for players j > i:
(i) No deviation from player j Æ i ≠ 1: Note that because µi œ [0, 1], we
have that µi Æ
1
1≠ ”tú≠1j
2
µi+ ”t
ú≠1
j . In order to show that (1.7) holds,
we can therefore show that (1≠ ”j)+ ”jaj Æ ”jµi, which is equivalent to
1≠”j
”j
+aj Æ ai≠1+ 1≠”1”1 . This inequality holds ’j Æ i≠1, as
1≠”j
”j
Æ 1≠”1”1
and aj Æ ai≠1.
(ii) No deviation from player j > i: We can rearrange (1.7) to get
”t
ú
j Ø
1≠ ”j + ”jaj ≠ ”jµi
1≠ µi . (1.8)
First, note that if j /œ N i+ then j has no incentive to deviate as ”túj >
0 Ø 1≠”j+”jaj≠”jµi1≠µi . Now let j œ N i+. Since tú has been chosen such that
(1.8) is satisfied for player jú, (1.8) is also satisfied for all other players
in N i+, and no player j œ N i+ will have an incentive to deviate.
We conclude that for   su ciently close to zero, ‡(µi, túi , i) is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium.
Remark 1 (Dispensability of public correlation). In Lemma 3, we show that
‡(µi, túi , i) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium and that túi goes to infinity as  
approaches zero. Instead of using the strategy ‡(µi, túi , i), which relies on public
correlation, we can consider a deterministic strategy that alternates between
túi,1 zeros and túi,2 ones, where túi,1 + túi,2 = túi and túi,2/túi is arbitrarily close to
µi, starting with a payo  of zero. This is possible because túi goes to infinity.
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Intuitively, as   goes to zero, such a strategy will yield a payo  to any player
arbitrarily close to the payo  from ‡(µi, túi , i), while having a period-zero in-
centive compatibility constraint less stringent than (1.7) since µi is promised
on average over the first túi periods and the first period payo  is a zero. This
should ensure that Lemmas 3 and 4 still hold under such a deterministic strat-
egy. ⌃
We now compute the payo  of player i from ‡(µi, túi , i) in order to bound
the distance between ai and ai≠1.
Lemma 4. ’i œ {2, . . . , n≠ 1}, we have that either:
(i) ’ j > i, |aj ≠ ai≠1| œ O ( ), or
(ii) |ai ≠ ai≠1| œ O ( ) +O
1
ajúi ≠ ai
2
, where júi > i.
Proof. Again, for notational convenience, we omit the i subscript on júi , túi and
ri. IfN i+ is empty we directly have an indication of the distance between aj and
ai≠1 by noting that no player j > i has an incentive to deviate from ‡(µi, ·, i),
irrespective of · : if N i+ = ÿ, then ’ j > i , 0 Æ aj ≠ ai≠1 Æ 1≠”1”1 ≠
1≠”j
”j
, which
implies that |aj ≠ ai≠1| œ O ( ).
Assume now that N i+ ”= ÿ, so that ‡(µi, tú, i) is a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. We now compute Player i’s payo  from ‡(µi, tú, i) and compare it with
his lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo . The payo  to Player i from
the strategy profile ‡(µi, tú, i) is:
(1≠ ”túi )µi + ”t
ú
i = µi + ”t
ú
i (1≠ µi)
= µi + ”≠ri
31≠ ”jú + ”júajú ≠ ”júµi
1≠ µi
4 ﬂi
ﬂjú (1≠ µi)
Ø ai,
where the last inequality holds because ai is i’s lowest subgame-perfect equi-
librium payo . This inequality can be rewritten as
ai ≠ µi
1≠ µi Æ ”
≠r
i
31≠ ”jú + ”júajú ≠ ”júµi
1≠ µi
4 ﬂi
ﬂjú
≠1 31≠ ”jú + ”júajú ≠ ”júµi
1≠ µi
4
,
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where ﬂiﬂjú ≠ 1 > 0, as i < jú. Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that for
  Æ  ijú , (1≠ ”jú + ”júajú ≠ ”júµi) / (1≠ µi) < ÷ijú , where ÷ijú < 1 does not
depend on  . For   Æ  ijú , we therefore have:
ai ≠ µi
1≠ µi Æ ”
≠r
i ÷
ﬂi
ﬂjú
≠1
ijú
31≠ ”jú + ”júajú ≠ ”júµi
1≠ µi
4
.
The previous inequality can be rewritten as:13
ai ≠ ai≠1 Æ 1≠ ”1
”1
+ ”≠ri ÷
ﬂi
ﬂjú
≠1
ijú ”jú (ai ≠ ai≠1)+
”≠ri ÷
ﬂi
ﬂjú
≠1
ijú
3
1≠ ”jú + ”jú (ajú ≠ ai)≠ ”jú 1≠ ”1
”1
4
. (1.9)
Because
lim
 æ0
”≠ri ÷
ﬂi
ﬂjú
≠1
ijú ”jú = lim æ0 ”
≠r
i ÷
ﬂi
ﬂjú
≠1
ijú = ÷
ﬂi
ﬂjú
≠1
ijú < 1,
there exists a Ê i Ø 0 and an R < 1 such that for   Æ Ê i we have:
ai ≠ ai≠1 Æ 1≠ ”1
”1
+R (ai ≠ ai≠1) +R
3
1≠ ”jú + ”jú (ajú ≠ ai)≠ ”jú 1≠ ”1
”1
4
.
To conclude, note that 1≠”1(1≠R)”1 +
R
1≠R
1
1≠ ”jú ≠ ”jú 1≠”1”1
2
is of order  ,
and that R1≠R”jú (ajú ≠ ai) œ O (ajú ≠ ai), as R < 1 is a fixed constant.
Recall that the di erence between the two most patient players’ lowest
subgame-perfect equilibrium payo s, an and an≠1, is of order   (Lemma 2).
Moreover in Lemma 4 we established a bound for the distance between ai≠1
and the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo  of a more patient player.
We can now establish by induction that the lowest subgame-perfect equilib-
rium payo s of any two players are arbitrarily close to each other as   tends
to zero.
Lemma 5. |ai ≠ aj | œ O( ), ’ (i, j).
13By canceling the 1≠µi and adding and subtracting ”júai inside the term in parentheses.
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Proof. By Lemma 2, we know that this result is true for i, j œ {n≠ 1, n}. We
now prove this result by induction. Assume that ’i, j Ø k, |ai ≠ aj | œ O( ).
Our aim is to show that ’i Ø k, |ai ≠ ak≠1| œ O( ).
If the first statement of Lemma 4 holds, then we have that ’j > k, |aj ≠
ak≠1| œ O ( ). Moreover, |ak ≠ ak≠1| Æ |ak ≠ aj |+ |aj ≠ ak≠1| for any j > k.
By induction, |ak ≠ aj | œ O ( ), thus we have |ak ≠ ak≠1| œ O ( ).
If the second statement of Lemma 4 holds then ÷ kú > k such that |ak ≠
ak≠1| œ O ( ) + O (akú ≠ ak). From our induction hypothesis, |akú ≠ ak| œ
O ( ), which implies that |ak ≠ ak≠1| œ O ( ). Using the triangle inequality,
’i Ø k, |ai ≠ ak≠1| Æ |ai ≠ ak|+ |ak ≠ ak≠1| œ O ( ).
This shows that ’i, j Ø k ≠ 1, |ai ≠ aj | œ O( ).
Finally, we show that the lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo  of
Player 1 is arbitrarily close to zero as   tends to zero. This is done by using
a proof similar to the one of Lemma 4, and considering the strategy profile
‡(0, tú1, 1).
Lemma 6. a1 œ O ( ) .
Proof. We follow the same line of reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4, using the strategy ‡(0, tú1, 1). As in Lemma 3, ‡(0, tú1, 1) is well
defined and constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Again, for notational
convenience, we omit the subscript 1.
The strategy profile ‡(0, tú, 1) yields a payo  of ”tú1 = ”≠r1 (1≠ ”jú + ”júajú)
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
to Player 1. Because a1 is player 1’s lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo ,
we have
a1 Æ ”≠r1 (1≠ ”jú + ”júajú)
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
= ”≠r1 (1≠ ”jú + ”júajú)
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
≠1 !1≠ ”jú + ”jú (ajú ≠ a1)"
+ ”≠r1 ”jú (1≠ ”jú + ”júajú)
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
≠1
a1.
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Because
lim
 æ0
”≠r1 ”jú (1≠ ”jú + ”júajú)
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
≠1 = lim
 æ0
”≠r1 (1≠ ”jú + ”júajú)
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
≠1 Æ ÷
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
≠1
1jú ,
and ÷
ﬂ1
ﬂjú
≠1
1jú < 1 there exists an R < 1 and  ú1 Ø 0 such that for   Æ  ú1 we
have
a1 Æ R
3
1≠ ”jú + ”jú (ajú ≠ a1)
4
+Ra1,
or
a1 Æ R1≠R
3
1≠ ”jú + ”jú (ajú ≠ a1)
4
.
We know from Lemma 5 that ajú≠a1 œ O ( ), which concludes the proof,
as R < 1 does not depend on  .
We are now able to prove Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 1. From Lemma 5 and 6, we have that ’i œ {1, . . . , n},
|ai ≠ a1| œ O ( ) and a1 œ O ( ). Using the triangle inequality, |ai| Æ |ai ≠
a1|+ |a1| œ O( ).
1.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered the set of games where the classical folk theorem
does not apply because of the low dimensionality of the set of stage-game
payo s. In such setups, it is not possible to create player-specific punishments
which are necessary to sustain low values of equilibrium payo s.
We extend the setting by allowing players to have di erent discount factors
and prove that player-specific punishments as close as desired to the player’s
individual minmax can be constructed. Those punishments can be used to
enforce any stage-game payo  as an equilibrium payo . This generalizes the
folk theorem to games which violate NEU but where players have di erent
discount factors. They can also be used to yield equilibrium payo s strictly
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outside the convex hull of the stage-game payo s. However, the characteriza-
tion of this multidimensional boundary for the complete equilibrium pay o 
set is left for future research.
In the next sections, we first show that our result does require all players to
have di erent discount factors and does not hold if two “intermediate” players
share the same discount factor. We then briefly discuss subsequent research
that generalizes our result.
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Wen, Q. (1994): “The “folk theorem” for repeated games with complete
information,” Econometrica, 62(4), 949–954.
1.A Two players with same discount factor
In this section we confirm that our result does indeed require all players to have
di erent discount factors by means of a counter-example similar to the one
presented in Section 1.1.1, but with four players. We present a particular four-
player game in which player 1 and player 2 have the same discount factor ”˜ œ
(”3, ”4), but such that in every stage game at least one of them is guaranteed
a payo  of 1/2.
In the game of Figure 1.3, player 1 chooses a row, player 2 chooses a
column, player 3 chooses between the two left matrices or the two right ones
and player 4 chooses between the two top matrices or the two bottom ones.
Notice that in this game, the min-max payo  of each player is 0, and there is
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1) which yields a payo  of
1/2, so that assumptions A1 to A3 are satisfied.
0,0,0,0 1,1,1,1
0,0,0,0 1,1,1,1
1,1,1,1 0,0,0,0
1,1,1,1 0,0,0,0
0,0,0,0 1,1,1,1
0,0,0,0 1,1,1,1
0,0,0,0 0,0,0,0
1,1,1,1 1,1,1,1
Figure 1.3: A four-player stage game with one-dimensional payo s
Let –i denote the probability with which player i plays his first action
(either top or left). The expected payo  to all players from strategy profile
(–1,–2,–3,–4) œ [0, 1]4 is
(1≠ –2)–3 + –2(1≠ –3)–4 + (1≠ –1)(1≠ –3)(1≠ –4).
We now show that for any stage-game action profile, at least one of player 1
or player 2 has a deviation guaranteeing him a payo  of 1/2.
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Consider the payo  from a deviation for player 1. If player 1 plays the top
row (–1 = 1), his payo  is
u11 = (1≠ –2)–3 + –2(1≠ –3)–4,
while his payo  from playing the bottom row (–1 = 0) is
u01 = (1≠ –2)–3 + –2(1≠ –3)–4 + (1≠ –3)(1≠ –4).
For player 1, playing the bottom row is the best deviation (bottom indeed
weakly dominates top).
For player 2, the payo  from playing the left column (–2 = 1) is
u12 = (1≠ –3)–4 + (1≠ –1)(1≠ –3)(1≠ –4),
while his payo  from playing the right column (–2 = 0) is
u02 = –3 + (1≠ –1)(1≠ –3)(1≠ –4).
We now show thatmax{u01, u02, u12} Ø 1/2 for any quadruple (–1,–2,–3,–4).
First let —i = 1 ≠ –i. We can then rewrite u01, u02 and u12 as —2(1 ≠ —3) +
(1 ≠ —2)—3(1 ≠ —4) + —3—4 = (1 ≠ 2—3 + —3—4)—2 + —3, —3(1 ≠ —4) + —1—3—4
and 1 ≠ —3 + —1—3—4, respectively. As —2 only appears in u01, we can first
minimize max{u01, u02, u12} with respect to —2. Moreover, u01 is linear in —2, so
that it’s minimum is —3 +min(0, 1≠ 2—3 + —3—4).
We now notice that —4 only appears in the expression —3—4 and that —1
only appears in the expression —1—3—4. Let “4 = —3—4 and “1 = —1“4, our
problem is equivalent to showing that the minimum for “1, —3 and “4 such
that 0 Æ “1 Æ “4 Æ —3 Æ 1 of the maximum between —3+min(0, 1≠ 2—3+“4),
—3 ≠ “4 + “1 and 1≠ —3 + “1 is greater than one half.
Consider first the case when 1 ≠ 2—3 + “4 Ø 0. Our problem is to show
that max{—3,—3 ≠ “4 + “1, 1≠ —3 + “1} Ø 1/2 whenever 1≠ 2—3 + “4 Ø 0 and
32
Chapter 1. Di erent time preferences 1.B. Generalization
0 Æ “1 Æ “4 Æ —3 Æ 1. Given that “1 Æ “4 then —3 Ø —3 ≠ “4 + “1. First,
if —3 is the maximum of those three terms then —3 Ø 1 ≠ —3 + “1, so that
2—3 Ø 1 + “1 Ø 1, or —3 Ø 1/2. Second, if 1 ≠ —3 + “1 is the maximum of
those three terms then 1≠—3+ “1 Ø —3, so that —3 Æ (1+ “1)/2 and therefore
1≠ —3 + “1 Ø 1≠ (1 + “1)/2 + “1 = (1 + “1)/2 Ø 1/2.
Consider now the case when 1≠2—3+“4 Æ 0. Our problem is to show that
max{1≠ —3 + “4,—3 ≠ “4 + “1, 1≠ —3 + “1} Ø 1/2 whenever 1≠ 2—3 + “4 Æ 0
and 0 Æ “1 Æ “4 Æ —3 Æ 1. Given that “1 Æ “4 then 1≠ —3 + “4 Ø 1≠ —3 + “1.
First if 1 ≠ —3 + “4 Ø —3 ≠ “4 + “1 then —3 Æ 1/2 + “4 ≠ “1/2, so that
1 ≠ —3 + “4 Ø (1 + “1)/2 Ø 1/2. Second if 1 ≠ —3 + “4 Æ —3 ≠ “4 + “1 then
—3 Ø 1/2 + “4 ≠ “1/2, so that “1 + —3 ≠ “4 Ø (1 + “1)/2 Ø 1/2.
Hence there is always one player amongst player 1 and player 2 who can
achieve a payo  of 1/2 in the stage game. Therefore for any stage-game profile
(–1,–2,–3,–4) œ [0, 1]4, both player 1 and player 2 are guaranteed a repeated-
game payo  of at least
(1≠ ”˜)12 + ”˜u
ú,
where uú is the minimum payo  attainable in any subgame-perfect equilibrium
for players 1 and 2.14 If (–1,–2,–3,–4) is part of an equilibrium that gives
players 1 and 2 their lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo  we then have:
uú Ø (1≠ ”˜)12 + ”˜u
ú,
so that
uú Ø 12 .
1.B Generalization
In a more recent paper, Chen and Takahashi (2012) generalize our result.
They aggregate the stage-game dimensionality assumption with the di erent
14Note that because they have the same stage game payo s and the same discount factor,
players 1 and 2 must have the same lowest subgame-perfect equilibrium payo .
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discount factor assumption in a dynamic non-equivalent utility assumption
(DNEU). DNEU simply states that when players have equivalent utilities they
must have di erent discount factors.15 Chen and Takahashi (2012) dispense
with the pure minmax assumption that we make and provide a more explicit
construction of the dynamic player specific punishments, whereas we rely on
the compactness of the equilibrium payo  set and use this to provide bounds
on the di erence between the lowest equilibrium payo s of any two players.
We note however that Chen and Takahashi (2012) rely on the compactness of
the set of feasible repeated-game payo s and use the lowest feasible payo  for
each player without explicitly constructing them.
15In this chapter we considered a case in which all players have equivalent utilities, which
is the most problematic case for the folk theorem. DNEU therefore reduces to having all
players have di erent discount factors in that case.
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2.1 Introduction
How does the labor market allocate workers to firms in equilibrium? Becker
(1974) tells us that in a frictionless environment with complementaries in pro-
duction, better workers should be assigned to better firms and that matching
should be one-to-one. The data however tells us a di erent story where sim-
ilar workers are paid di erently and where firms hire many di erent types of
workers (Mortensen, 2005). The presence of rents generated by search fric-
tions can explain the departure from the Beckerian world, indeed if it takes
time to find a new matching opportunity, workers and firms might settle for
less than optimal partners, generating mismatch in equilibrium. Shimer and
Smith (2003); Atakan (2006); Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) extend the result
of Becker (1974) to environment with search frictions and show that the prin-
ciple that stronger complementarities pushes better workers into better firms
continues to apply.
Recovering the equilibrium allocation and the production function of matches
between firms and workers is made di cult by the fact that only wages are
observed, but actual matches’ productivity is not. Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis (1999) first studied this distributional assignment using a regression
framework with firm and worker fixed e ects which suggested very little sort-
ing of more productive workers into more productive firms. Eeckhout and
Kircher (2011) shows that, if the sign sorting is not always recoverable from
wage data only, the strength of sorting is. Hagedorn, Law, and Manovskii
(2012) show how information about co-workers can be used to identify non-
parametrically the allocation distribution and the production function. Their
approach utilizes the fact that with Nash bargaining, the wage ranks work-
ers by type within each firm. They propose a rank aggregation method and
demonstrate that it performs well on realistic sample size. Yet in their frame-
work identical workers are paid similar wages when employed in the same
firm.
In this paper we develop an equilibrium search model with two-sided het-
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erogeneity, on-the-job search, training cost and vacancy creation. In the
model, firms invest to create new positions, but each position can only hire
exactly one worker. This creates a capacity constraint that generates sorting
in equilibrium: firms and workers can decide not to match if it is more prof-
itable to continue searching. This di ers from Bagger and Lentz (2008) where
sorting happens because higher ability workers move more quickly to better
firms.
In section 1 we introduce the model formally, define the equilibrium and
characterize some monotonicity properties. In section 2 we develop a construc-
tive proof for the non parametric identification of the allocation of workers to
firms and the underlying production function.
2.2 The model
We consider an economy populated by fixed numbers of workers and firms,
all infinitely lived, risk-neutral, and discounting the future at rate r. Time is
continuous.
2.2.1 Agents, technology and preferences
The economy is composed of a continuum of workers index by x and a con-
tinuum of firms index by (‘, y). The index x captures the ability of a worker,
y represents the productivity of a firm and ‘, the ability a firm has to create
new positions. More formally, a firm (y, ‘) can create n new jobs per period
at convex cost c(n, y, ‘) and a worker x employed in firm y produces output
f(x, y) every period where fx > 0, fy > 0. Employed workers are paid a wage
w œ R which depends on their employment history. A firm employs multiple
workers and we denote by h(x,w|y, ‘) the mass of workers employed by a firm
of type (y, ‘) assuming firms to be large. Jobs are destroyed at exogenous rate
”. We denote v(y, ‘) the number of unfilled jobs for that firm. Jobs are unfilled
when originally created and when workers decide to move to a di erent firm.
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Workers and firms are risk neutral, forward looking and discount at rate r.
The mass of unemployed worker is denoted u(x).
2.2.2 Meeting technology and matching decision
x ≥ u(x)
y ≥ v(y)
meet
z ≥ G(z)
M0 = 1, w = w0
M0 = 0
⁄
µ
matc
h
no match
Figure 2.1: Meeting process and matching decision for unemployed
Workers and vacant jobs are brought together through a random meeting
technology characterized by ⁄, Ÿ and µ := ⁄
s
u/
s
v. With probability Ÿ⁄
(or ⁄) an (un)employed worker meets a vacancy randomly drawn from v(y, ‘).
Conversely with probably Ÿµ a given vacancy meets an employed worker ran-
domly drawn from h(x,w, y, ‘) and with probability µ a random unemployed
worker from u(x). When a worker and firm meet, a positive random training
cost z ≥ G(z) is drawn and must be paid if the match is formed.
Then comes the matching decision. When a firm (y, ‘) meets an unem-
ployed worker x with training cost z, the worker and the firm enter a bar-
gaining process over the wage that splits the generated surplus. The outside
option of the worker is remaining unemployed and the firm’s is the present
value of vacancy. We denote by M0(x, y, ‘, z) œ {0, 1} the matching decision
and by w0(x, y, ‘, z) the outcome wage. The wage w0 is set by generalized
Nash bargaining.
In the case where a vacancy (y, ‘) is matched to an already employed worker
x in firm (yÕ, ‘Õ) at some wage wÕ, the two firms enter a Bertrand competition
over the wage o ered the worker. We call M1(x, y, ‘, yÕ, ‘Õ, zÕ) œ {0, 1} the
matching decision. It is equal to one if the worker is poached by the new
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vacancy. We also denote by w1(x, y, ‘, yÕ, ‘Õ, zÕ) the outcome wage. M1 and
w1 are pinned down in equilibrium by the Bertrand competition.
2.2.3 Within period timing
First is production where employed worker collect their wage w, unemployed
workers collect their flow value b, firms collect output f(x, y) for each of their
matches, choose how many new vacancies n(y, ‘) to create and pay the va-
cancy creation cost c(n, y, ‘). Second is the meeting stage. Vacancies find
unemployed (employed) workers randomly at rate µ (Ÿµ), workers find vacan-
cies at rate ⁄ (Ÿ⁄) and for each meeting the training cost z is drawn. Third is
the matching decision and wage determination. Workers from unemployment
bargain with their vacancies with outcome (M0, w0). Employed workers with
an outside o er received the Bertrand outcome (M1, w1).
2.2.4 Flow equations for distributions
(M0, w0,M1, w1) and ⁄,Ÿ, ”, G define a Markovian law of motion for the dis-
tributions (h, u, v). We start by writing the flow equation for the distribution
of unemployed workers
ut+1(x) = ut(x)
5
1≠ ⁄
⁄⁄⁄
M0(x, y, ‘, z)g(z)v(y, ‘) dy dz d‘
6
+ (1≠ ut(x))”,
and we then consider the flow equation for the distribution of vacancies. This
is given by
vt+1(y, ‘) = nt(y, ‘) + vt(y, ‘)
5
1≠ µ
⁄⁄
M0(x, y, ‘, z)g(z)u(x) dxdz
≠Ÿµ
⁄⁄⁄⁄
M1(x, y, ‘, yÕ, ‘Õ, z)G(z)h(x,w, yÕ, ‘Õ) dyÕ dzÕ d‘Õ dx
6
,
and finally the flow equation for the joint distribution of workers and firms is
given in Appendix. We call  1 the implied Markov transition kernel for the
worker over the state space X, ,R.
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2.2.5 Equilibrium Definition
[SSE] Given primitives f,G, r,—,⁄,Ÿ, c, b, ”, a Stationary Search Equilib-
rium › is defined by distributions h, u, v, matching and wages outcomes
M0, w0,M1, w1 and firm job creation decision n(y, ‘) such that:
(i) (M0, w0) solves generalized Nash bargaining between unemployed work-
ers and vacancies (2.2.2) taking (h, u, v) as given
(ii) (M1, w1) solves the Bertrand competition (2.2.2) taking (h, u, v) as given
(iii) (h, u, v) are the stationary distributions of the Markovian law of motions
generated by (M0, w0,M1, w1) and ⁄,Ÿ, ”, G.
(iv) firms optimally choose n(y, ‘)
It is well known that the equilibrium might not be unique, and that for a
set of primitives f,G, r,—,⁄,Ÿ, c, b, ” their might exists several such ›. In the
identification part of this paper, we will show that both › and the primitives
are identified. The procedure itself identifies the realized equilibrium among
multiple possible ones. When generating counterfactual, we should then worry
about checking for equilibrium multiplicity, but during estimation, we do not
need to worry about it.
2.3 Properties of the equilibrium
Let U(x) denote the value of unemployment and let V(y) be the value of a
vacancy for a job of type y. Let P(x, y) denote the value of all future incomes
that the worker and the job are going to generate. We define the match surplus
as
S(x, y) := P(x, y)≠ U(x)≠ V(y),
and we define Ê(x, y, s) the wage that delivers a surplus s to the w.
When an unemployed worker of type x meets a vacancy of type y, a non-
negative adjustment cost (training cost, mobility cost, etc.) is drawn from a
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Figure 2.2: Worker meets outside o er
distribution G. This adjustment cost is sunk. Then, if S(x, y) Ø z, the worker
is hired according to a contract specifying a fixed wage w. This means that a
worker’s wage can be modified only if both parties agree to renegotiate. This
happens only if one of the two parties has a credible threat to break the match.
We assume that the value of the wage contract negotiated with an unem-
ployed worker is equal to the value of unemployment plus a share — of the total
surplus net of the adjustment cost, S(x, y)≠z. That is a wage w0(x, y, z) such
that
W (w0(x, y, z), x, y) = U(x) + — [S(x, y)≠ z] ,
whereW(w, x, y) denotes the present value of a wage contract w. The employer
receives the value V(y) + (1≠ —) [S(x, y)≠ z] if it pays w0(x, y, z).
As shown in Figure 2.2, when an employed worker of type (x, y) currently
receiving a value W = W(w, x, y), with 0 Æ W ≠ U(x) Æ S(x, y), meets
a vacancy of type yÕ with training cost zÕ, the two firms enter a Bertrand
competition and three things can happen.
First if S(x, yÕ)≠zÕ > S(x, z) the worker moves to the new firm and extract
the surplus from y, she gets W = S(x, y) + U(x). Otherwise if S(x, z) >
S(x, yÕ) ≠ zÕ > W ≠ U(x), the worker stays with firm y and extract a wage
increase thanks to the outside o er. She getsW = S(x, yÕ)≠zÕ+U(x). Finally
if W ≠ U(x) > S(x, yÕ) ≠ zÕ nothing happens, the value and the wage do not
change.
The present value of unemployment. Consider a worker of type x
who is unemployed for a whole period. During that period she earns a flow
income of b(x) and at the end of the period she meets with a vacancy y with
probability ⁄v(y). The match is consummated if S(x, y) Ø z, and the workers
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receives a share — [S(x, y)≠ z] of the surplus. Hence
rU(x) = b(x) + —
⁄
G [S(x, y)]⁄v(y) dy, (2.1)
where we denote G(t) © s max{t≠ z, 0}g(z) dz.
The present value of a vacancy. Let V(y) denote the expected profit for
a vacant job
rV(y) = (1≠ —)
⁄
G [S(x, y)]µu(x) dx
+
⁄⁄
G #S(x, y)≠ S(x, yÕ)$Ÿµh(x, yÕ) dxdyÕ. (2.2)
A firm operates only if the value of a vacancy is positive. To avoid the is-
sue that V(y) might be negative for some y, we shall assume zero cost of
maintaining vacancies, “ = 0.
The match surplus. We now turn to the total surplus S(x, y) of a match
a match (x, y). Flow output is f(x, y). The match faces a flow probability
of dissolution ”, in which case the continuation value is 0 for the firm (a
job is destroyed), and U(x) for the worker. Otherwise, with flow probability
Ÿ⁄v(y)G (S(x, yÕ)≠ S(x, y)), the worker is poached by a vacancy of type yÕ.
In this case, the worker moves and pockets a value of U(x)+S(x, y), while the
firm is left with a vacant job worth V(y), so that the net continuation gain for
the firm-worker match is 0. Summing up, match value solves:
(r + ”)S(x, y) = f(x, y)≠ rU(x)≠ (r + ”)V(y). (2.3)
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The present value of being employed. DenotingW(w, x, y) for the value
of a wage w given match characteristics (x, y), we have
(r + ” + Ÿ⁄)W(w, x, y) = w + ”U(x)
+Ÿ⁄
⁄⁄
max
Ó
U(x)+min )S(x, y),S(x, yÕ)≠zÕ*,W(w, x, y)Ôg(zÕ)v(yÕ) dzÕ dyÕ,
as a poached worker gets the second price U(x) + min {S(x, y),S(x, yÕ)≠ zÕ}
as long as it is greater than her reservation value W(w, x, y).
Job Creation.
A firm (y, ‘) controls its stock of available jobs, and compensates for job ob-
solescence, by creating n(y, ‘) new jobs per period at a cost c(n, y, ‘):
n(y, ‘) = argmax
n
nV(y)≠ c(n, y, ‘),
where V(y) is the present value of a vacant job and c(n, ‘) is the cost of
investments in tools, computers, etc, that accompany the creation of n jobs.
Hence,
cÕ[n(y, ‘), y, ‘] = V(y). (2.4)
Wages
The preceding Bellman equation readily defines w as a function of (x, y)
and the surplus to the worker W(w, x, y) ≠ U(x). For any feasible value
s œ [0,S(x, y)] of the worker surplus, the contract stipulates a wage
w(s, x, y) = rU(x) + (r + ”)s
≠ Ÿ⁄
⁄ Ó
G #S(x, yÕ)≠ s$≠ G #S(x, yÕ)≠ S(x, y)$ Ôv(yÕ) dyÕ. (2.5)
It thus follows that, for S(x, y)≠z Ø 0, the wage coming out of unemploy-
ment for a worker x into firm (y, z) is given by w (— [S(x, y)≠ z] , x, y). Then
for a worker x transitioning from a firm yÕ to a firm (yÕ, zÕ) the wage is given
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by w (S(x, yÕ)≠ z, x, y). Notice that the maximal wage that a worker x can
be o ered for a job y is when she gets the whole surplus, i.e. s = S(x, y):
w(x, y) := w [S(x, y), x, y] (2.6)
= rU(x) + (r + ”)S(x, y) = f(x, y)≠ (r + ”)V(y).
Similarly, the minimal wage for a worker x at a job y is obtained for s = 0,
which happens when the adjustment cost z is equal to the whole surplus
S(x, y), and the contract value is equal to the value of unemployment U(x):
w(x, y) := w(0, x, y) (2.7)
= rU(x)≠ Ÿ⁄
⁄ Ó
G #S(x, yÕ)$≠ G #S(x, yÕ)≠ S(x, y)$ Ôv(yÕ) dyÕ.
This minimum wage is attained for all (x, y) if distribution G has a large
support, for example R+. We assume that functions f(x, y) and b(x) are
bounded and twice continuously di erentiable, and we omit the proof that
this property is passed on to values U(x),V(y) and S(x, y), and to the wage
function w(s, x, y).
Lemma 7. If f(x, y) is increasing in x and y, b(x) is nondecreasing, and c
is convex, then the following monotonicity properties hold true:
(i) U(x) is increasing in x.
(ii) V(y) is increasing in y.
(iii) The maximal wage w(x, y) is increasing in x and so is w(x) © maxy w(x, y).
(iv) If in addition f is supermodular (ˆ
2f(x,y)
ˆxˆy > 0), then S(x, y) and w(x, y)
are also supermodular and the probability of moving from y to yÕ > y
increases with x.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
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2.4 Identification
In this section we address the issue of the identification of the model given
linked employer-employee data. Here we think of the data as a collection of
N independent worker trajectories drawn from the stochastic process  t =
(X,Et, Rt, Jt, Yt, Ct), t Ø 1, defined with respect to a filtered probability space
( ,A, {At}tØ0,P), where Et is the employment status (Et = 1 if currently
hired and 0 if unemployed), Rt stands for a worker’s wage at time t (missing
if the worker is unemployed) and Jt is the identifier of the firm employing
the worker (if the worker is currently employed; missing otherwise), Yt is the
type of the firm Jt, Ct its vacancy creation cost and X is the type of the
worker. (Et, Rt, Jt, It) is observed and (X,Yt, Ct) is not. Secondly we are also
interested in computing information at the firm level. For instance we might
want to compute the average wage in the firm. Given the set of firm identifier
J we can properly define the conditional probability with respect to any firm
J œ J.
We then want to express su cient conditions for a given process ( ,A, {At}tØ0,P)
to be generated from a particular model › . This ties the probability mea-
sure P to the properties the endogenous distributions and decision rules of the
model: The random process  t defined on ( ,A, {At}tØ0,P) is generated by
the equilibrium › if
(i) X ≥ U([0, 1])
(ii) P {X Æ x|Et = 0} =
s x
0 u(x) dx
(iii) P {X Æ x, Yt Æ y,Rt Æ w,Ct Æ ‘|E0 = 1} =
s x
0
s y
0 h(x, y, w, ‘)/u(x) dxdy
(iv)  t+1| t is implied by (M0, w0,M1, w1) and µ,⁄,Ÿ, ”, G.
(v) There exists two deterministic functions júand ‘ú in Jæ [0, 1] such that
’Ê, t, Yt = jú(Jt), Ct = ‘ú(Jt)
Property (i, ii,iii) insure that the distribution in P match the distributions im-
plied by the model. In includes the link between the job creation cost and the
firm size. Property (iv) guarantees that law of motion of the random process
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generated on the filtration is distributed according to the law of motions im-
plied by the equilibrium on the model. It guarantees that wages and mobility
are correctly generated. Finally property (v) makes sure that the firm type
does not change over time and across observations. The identification exercise
is to use those properties without using (X,Y ) to reconstruct the model. We
now proceed to show that this information allows to identify the structural
parameters under the following assumption.
Assumption 1.
(i) Let zú = maxx,y S(x, y). G(0) = 0 and G has continuous support on
[0, zú]
(ii) f(x, y) is di erentiable and fx > 0, fy > 0
(iii) c(n, y, ‘) is di erentiable, convex in n, c(0, y, ‘) = 0, increasing in ‘ œ
[0, 1]
Condition (i) implies that the support of G is large enough so that, for all
x, the set of couples (y, z) such that S(x, y) = z is not empty. Such match
combinations (x, y, z) are only marginally profitable. Similarly we assume
that G(z) is positive everywhere on [0, zú] to guaranty that with some posi-
tive probability every match with positive surplus will be formed. Condition
(ii) imposes comparative advantage in production. Finally (iii) restricts the
intercept of the cost function.
We can now state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1. Identification. Set the discount rate r. Under Assumption
1, knowing conditional expectations on ( ,A, {At}tØ0,P) for all observables,
generated from an equilibrium ›, and knowing the aggregate measure of va-
cancies V , then all primitives f,G,—,⁄,Ÿ,c,b, ” and endogenous values of › are
identified.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 is constructive and a direct implication of
Lemma 1-9.
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The proposition states that knowing the random process  t on observables
only is enough to measure directly the primitives of the model.
Lemma 8. The worker type is identified:
’Ê, R = QR¯(X).
where R := maxt{Rt : Et = 1} is the A-measurable maximum wage for each
Ê, and QR(·) its quantile function.
Proof. By Proposition 7(iv), the highest wage that a worker will attain in
her career, w(x) = maxy w(x, y), is increasing in x. By construction, the A-
measurable variable R = w(X) is a deterministic and monotonic function of
the random variable X.
Lemma 9. U(x) is given by:
’x U(x) = EJEt [Wt | X = x,Et > Et≠1, Jt = J,Rt = Rmin(x, Jt)] ,
where Wt :=
qŒ
·=t
R·
(1+r)· is the A-measurable realized present value for each
(Ê, t), and Rmin(x, J) := minÊœ ,tœT {Rt : Et > Et≠1, Jt = J,X = x} is the
minimum wage paid to worker x in firm J .
Proof. It follows from Subsection 2.3 that the minimum wage ever paid to
a worker x by a firm y is w(x, y) = w(0, x, y), delivering the same present
value as unemployment. This is just stating that the worse contract a worker
would accept is a contract that makes her indi erent to remaining unemployed.
However at this point we can’t aggregate over di erent firms since Y is latent.
We can do this averaging inside each firm, and then aggregate.
For each firm in the data, we can define the smallest wage collected by
any worker of a given type x. This requires us to take the expectation across
workers that worked at least once in a firm J . We can then average across
all firms. The only thing required at this point is that enough x-type workers
visited firm J, but this will always be the case as time grows. Then ’Ê œ
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 , x œ X, t œ T R(x, Jt) = w(x, Yt) as long as workers with type x do work in
firm J . We can now construct the value of unemployment using observables
from the data. Conditional on collecting Rmin, the expected present value
to the worker delivers exactly U(x) and gives the expression stated in the
Lemma.
Further more, since once the worker becomes unemployed again, he will be
getting U(x), one can use a finite sum to extract the value of unemployment.
The function U(x) is identified if, for all x provided that that given x works at
least in one firm, and that the z shock is large enough to deliver the reservation
wage. The latter will always be true under Assumption 1.
Lemma 10. Bargaining power — is given by:
— = EJ
5E0 [W0|E1 > E0, X = x,R1 = Rmax(x, J1), J1 = J ]≠ U(x)
S(x, J)
6
,
where the surplus at firm J is given by
S(x, J) = Et [Wt|Jt ”= Jt≠1, Et = Et≠1 = 1, X = x, Jt≠1 = J ]≠ U(x).
Proof. We are going to use a similar procedure here. The highest wage col-
lected on coming out of unemployment delivers the highest possible surplus.
The present value associated with that wage delivers —S(x, y) to the worker.
Secondly workers going through a job to job transition actually extracts S(x, y)
from their current firm. More precisely:
’Ê, t Et [Wt|Jt ”= Jt≠1, Et = Er≠1 = 1, X = x] = S(x, Jt) + U(x)
Et
Ë
Wt|Et > Et≠1, X = x,Rt = R(x, Jt)
È
= —S(x, J1) + U(x)
selecting workers entering a given firm J with the highest entry wage, and
following them through their next job and then for ever.
Here however because the y value must match at the numerator and de-
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nominator, we need to aggregate over the J outside the fraction.
Lemma 11. G is given by
’z œ [0, zú] G(z) = PJ,w
;E [W1|X = x,E1 > E0, Jt = J,R1 = w]≠ U(x)
—
> z
<
.
Proof. Conditional on X = x we already have a measurement of S(x, J) for
any J using the subsequent job-to-job transition. Using the worker surplus
conditional on entry wage we can compute the distribution — (S(x, Y ) + z)
and as such we can estimate the distribution over z.
’x, J, Z1 E [W1|X = x,E1 > E0, Jt = J,R1 = w] = —(S(x, jú(J))+w≠10 (w|x, jú(J)))+U(x)
where the w≠10 (w|x, y) is the z from the model that delivers wage w for that
particular (x, y):
w≠10 (w|x, y) := {z|w0(x, y, z) = w}
This means that the distribution of z is directly identified. G is only recovered
on part of its support. We assume that G is analytic, and so that its global
properties can recovered from local identification.
Lemma 12. The e ciency of on-the-job search Ÿ is given by
Ÿ = P{Rt > Rt≠1 ﬁ Jt ”= Jt≠1|X,Rt≠1 = Rmin(J,X)}P{Et > Et≠1|X} ,
and the separation rate is given by
” = P{Et+1 < Et}P{Et = 1} .
Intuitively, when the worker is collecting the lowest wage, any viable match
will increase his current wage or trigger a job transition since he is currently
getting his reservation value. The denominator controls for the fact that not
all meeting are with viable partners.
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Lemma 13. The firm type is identified by the rank of Vˆ(J) where
Vˆ(J) = (1≠ —)
⁄
G [S(x, J)]u(x) dx+ Ÿ
⁄⁄
G [S(x, J)≠ S] “(S, x) dxdS.
and  Sx =
s
“ is joint distribution of (S, x) in the population
 (S, x) = P{X Æ x ﬁ S(X, J) Æ S}.
Proof. We know from Proposition 7 that the value of the vacancy is increasing
in y. We only need to show that Vˆ is a monotonic transformation of V(y).
Recall its expression:
rV(y) = (1≠ —)µ
⁄
G [S(x, y)]u(x) dx
+ Ÿµ
⁄⁄
G #S(x, y)≠ S(x, yÕ)$h(x, yÕ) dxdyÕ. (2.8)
We can ignore µ for now since it is an a ne transformation. From the previous
section we have identified S(x, jú(J)). Yet we still do not know the actual y
value itself. However given that G is also identified, and so are — and u(x),
the first integral term of V(J) is also computable from the random process
itself. The second integral requires the distribution of surplus the firm draws
from in the population. However we do observe the joint distribution over
(S(x, jú(J)), x) in the data since we were able to measure S(x, jú(J)) and x
from previous Lemma. Going from V(y) to Vˆ(J) is just a change of variable
from yÕ to S = S(x, yÕ). This allows us to construct Vˆ(J) for each J , which is
an a ne transformation of V (y) and so reveals Yt and the jú(·) function.
Lemma 14. The Surplus S(x, y) is identified by:
S(x, y) = Et [Wt|Jt ”= Jt≠1, Et = Et≠1 = 1, X = x, Yt≠1 = y]≠ U(x),
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and the steady state stock of vacancies by:
v(y) Ã P{Et > Et≠1|X = x, Jt = J}/G [S(x, y)] ,
and where the normalizing constant and µ are pinned down by the aggregate
mass of vacancy V .
Proof. This comes from the flow of workers out of unemployment µv(y)u(x)G [S(x, y)]
and the fact that the probability space is generated by the model. Importantly,
by calculating the meeting rate conditional on x, one removes the problem that
some meeting do not become matches. We established previously that S(x, J)
was identified for any J . We have also shown that the actual value of Y is
also identified for each J . So S(x, y) is identified for each (x, y).
It immediately follows that the production complementarity between x
and y, as defined by the information contained in the second partial derivative
ˆ2f(x,y)
ˆxˆy = (r + ”)
ˆ2S(x,y)
ˆxˆy , is identified.
Lemma 15. b(x) is given by :
b(x) = rU(x)≠ —
⁄
⁄v(y)G [S(x, y)] dy
and the match-production function f(x, y) by
f(x, y) = (r + ”)S(x, y)≠ rU(x)≠ (r + ”)V(y)
The Bellman equation for U(x) identifies b(x) and consequently the pro-
duction function f(x, y) is non-parametrically identified.
Lemma 16. The vacancy creation cost is given by
ˆc
ˆn
(”Ql|y(‘|y), ‘) = V(y)
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and the assumption that c(0, y, ‘) = 0, where Ql|y(‘|y) is the quantile function
of firm size conditional on y.
Proof. We reconstruct this from the joint distribution of vacancy types y and
average firm size. The first order condition of the vacancy investment is
ˆc
ˆn
(n, y, ‘) = V(y),
which links the firm size to the value of the vacancy
ˆc
ˆn
(”l(y), y, ‘) = V(y)
so from the joint distribution of y and long term firm size, we recover the cost
function c. It is actually easier to uncover through the quantile distribution.
Normalizing ‘ to [0, 1] we have that which together with the condition that
c(0) pins down the vacancy creation cost function.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the empirical content of matched employer-employee
data. We demonstrate how a model with two-sided heterogeneity, on-the-job
search and vacancy creation is non-parametrically identified provided that the
data is large enough in both sample size and time length. We hope to have
achieved three things in this paper. The first is to convince that there is a lot
of information in knowing who works where at what wage over time. Indeed
this is enough to recover unobserved heterogeneity of both workers and firms in
an environment where linear fixed-e ect regression deliver biased estimates.
Second we demonstrate how the firm size distribution in our model can be
utilized to learn the job creation process and costs faced by firms. Finally, on
a more practical matter, we hope that this paper will help applied work that
deal with smaller sample size with picking informative moments to estimate
model using methods of moments. For instance it is notable how important
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job to job transitions and the wages collected after that are to measuring the
surplus function.
Bibliography
Abowd, J., F. Kramarz, and D. Margolis (1999): “High wage workers
and high wage firms,” Econometrica, 67(2), 251–333.
Atakan, A. E. (2006): “Assortative matching with explicit search costs,”
Econometrica, 74(3), 667–680.
Bagger, J., and R. Lentz (2008): “An empirical model of wage dispersion
with sorting,” University of Wisconsin mimeo.
Becker, G. S. (1974): “A theory of marriage,” Journal of Political Economy,
pp. 299–351.
Eeckhout, J., and P. Kircher (2010): “Sorting and decentralized price
competition,” Econometrica, 78(2), 539–574.
Eeckhout, J., and P. Kircher (2011): “Identifying sorting in theory,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 78(3), 872–906.
Hagedorn, M., T. H. Law, and I. Manovskii (2012): “Identifying Equi-
librium Models of Labor Market Sorting,” Working Paper.
Mortensen, D. (2005): Wage dispersion: why are similar workers paid dif-
ferently. The MIT Press.
Shimer, R., and L. Smith (2003): “Assortative matching and search,”
Econometrica, 68(2), 343–369.
53
Chapter 2. Sorting in the labour market 2.A. More equilibrium properties
2.A More equilibrium properties
2.A.1 Equilibrium Worker and Vacancy Distributions
We now derive the steady-state distributions of worker skills in unemployment
and within firms, and the distribution of vacancies by firm type.
Steady-State Unemployment Distribution. The steady-state unemploy-
ment distribution u(x) satisfies the flow-balance equation
”
⁄⁄
h(x, y, ‘) dy d‘ = u(x)
⁄⁄
⁄v(y, ‘)G [S(x, y)] dy d‘,
The LHS is the flow of employed workers of type x who are laid o  in a small
time interval. The RHS is the flow of unemployed workers of type x who find
a job. Now, making use of the accounting equality u(x) = 1 ≠ s h(x, y) dy ,
we have, at the steady-state equilibrium,
” (1≠ u(x)) = u(x)
⁄
⁄v(y)G [S(x, y)] dy, (2.9)
Steady-State Employment Distributions. The following flow-balance
condition determines the steady-state distribution of employment h(x, y, ‘):
5
” +
⁄
Ÿ⁄µv(yÕ)G
#S(x, yÕ)≠ S(x, y)$ dyÕ6h(x, y, ‘)
= µv(y, ‘)G [S(x, y)]u(x) + Ÿ⁄µv(y, ‘)
⁄
G
#S(x, y)≠ S(x, yÕ)$h(x, yÕ) dyÕ.
(2.10)
where we make use of the marginal v(y) =
s
v(y, ‘) d‘.
Steady-State Distribution of Vacancies. The flow of new vacancies of
type y has two components: one is made of the new jobs n(y, ‘) created in
order to compensate for exogenous job obsolescence,
n(y, ‘) = ”
⁄
h(x, y, ‘) dx © ”¸(y, ‘),
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where ¸(y, ‘) =
s
h(x, y, ‘) dx is the size of a firm of type (y, ‘); another corre-
sponds to the flow of vacancies resulting from poaching. At the steady-state
equilibrium, the number of vacancies which find an employee must equate the
number of new vacancies:
v(y, ‘)
5⁄
µu(x)G [S(x, y)] dx+ Ÿ
⁄⁄
G
#S(x, y)≠ S(x, yÕ)$µh(x, yÕ) dxdyÕ6
= n(y, ‘) + Ÿ
⁄⁄
G
#S(x, yÕ)≠ S(x, y)$µv(yÕ)h(x, y) dyÕ dx, (2.11)
where the last component of the RHS is the flow of employees of jobs y who
get successfully poached by a firm yÕ.
2.B Proof for Proposition 1
(i) U(x) is increasing in x
Di erentiating equation (2.1),
rU Õ(x) = bÕ(x) + —
⁄
⁄v(y)G [S(x, y)] ˆS(x, y)
ˆx
dy,
where
ˆS(x, y)
ˆx
= 1
r + ”
ˆf(x, y)
ˆx
≠ r
r + ”U
Õ(x),
and reordering terms, we have
rU Õ(x) = b
Õ(x) + —⁄
s
v(y)G [S(x, y)] ˆf(x,y)ˆx dy
r + ” + —⁄
s
v(y)G [S(x, y)] dy ,
which is positive under the assumption that ˆf(x,y)ˆx > 0 and bÕ(x) Ø 0.
(ii) V(y) is increasing in y
Di erentiating equation (2.2),
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rV Õ(y) = (1≠ —)
⁄
G [S(x, y)] ˆS(x, y)
ˆy
µu(x) dx
+ Ÿ
⁄⁄
G
#S(x, y)≠ S(x, yÕ)$ ˆS(x, y)
ˆy
µh(x, yÕ) dxdyÕ,
where
ˆS(x, y)
ˆy
= 1
r + ”
ˆf(x, y)
ˆy
≠ V Õ(y),
and reordering terms, we have
5
r + (1≠ —)
⁄
G [S(x, y)]µu(x) dx
+ Ÿ
⁄⁄
G
#S(x, y)≠ S(x, yÕ)$µh(x, yÕ) dxdyÕ6(r + ”)V Õ(y)
= (1≠ —)
⁄
G [S(x, y)] ˆf(x, y)
ˆy
µu(x) dx
+ Ÿ
⁄⁄
G
#S(x, y)≠ S(x, yÕ)$ ˆf(x, y)
ˆy
µh(x, yÕ) dxdyÕ,
which is positive under the assumption that ˆf(x,y)ˆy > 0.
(iv) The maximal wage w(x, y) is increasing in x
By definition
w(x, y) = f(x, y)≠ (r + ”)V(y).
Hence, ˆw(x,y)ˆx =
ˆf(x,y)
ˆx is positive if
ˆf(x,y)
ˆx > 0. The Envelope Theorem
guarantees that this property passes on to maxy w(x, y).
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(iv) If f supermodular (ˆ
2f(x,y)
ˆxˆy > 0), then S(x, y) and w(x, y) are also
supermodular
From the previous definition ˆ
2w(x,y)
ˆxˆy =
ˆ2f(x,y)
ˆxˆy > 0;w(x, y) is supermodular.
Hence, (r + ”)S(x, y) = w(x, y)≠ rU(x) is also supermodular. Therefore, the
probability of moving from y to yÕ > y given x, Ÿ⁄v(y)G [S(x, yÕ)≠ S(x, y)],
is increasing with x.
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3.1 Introduction
What are the drivers behind the observed earnings and employment uncer-
tainty faced by workers in the labour market? How is this uncertainty mit-
igated by contracts between workers and firms in equilibrium? How is this
transmission mechanism a ected by policies? To address these questions, I
develop a framework where workers face uncertainty about both their pro-
ductivity and ability to locate new job opportunities and where firms choose
optimally how wages respond to shocks. Changes in aggregate, firm level
and worker specific productivities a ect the value of a worker to an employer.
At the same time, employed workers cannot immediately switch firms when
current productivity decreases and unemployed workers might require several
periods to locate a job opportunity. I show theoretically that in equilibrium,
firms o er contracts that smoothly track worker’s productivity in his current
match, while responding with di erent intensity to di erent sources of shocks.
I estimate the model using match employer-employee data and find that firm
shocks accounts for 20% of a worker’s permanent income uncertainty and that
only about a third of underlying productivity gets passed through into wages.
Employment transitions to unemployment and other jobs (40%) and worker
shocks (40%) are the main sources of uncertainties since those are not insured
by the firm. This confirms that unemployment insurance plays an important
role in providing insurance that cannot be insured by the wage contract since
the firm is unable to insure the worker when the employment relationship
ends. However if generous unemployment insurance reduces earning risk, it
also a ects the employment level and the total output of the economy.
Earnings and employment uncertainty have important implications for wel-
fare. A large body of literature has studied both theoretically and empirically
the nature of the income process and quantified how it translates into con-
sumption and wealth inequalities1. However, the income process itself is the
1(MaCurdy, 1982; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008; Attanasio and Pavoni, 2011;
Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri, 2009)
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observed part of the complex employment agreement that links a worker to
a job. The mechanism that defines this agreement in equilibrium, how the
payments are delivered over time and how they respond to underlying produc-
tivity shocks has long been of high interest to the literature both theoretically
and empirically. Knight (1921) first pointed out that one of the roles of the
firm is to insure workers against productivity shocks. Baily (1974) and Azari-
adis (1975) formalized the idea and showed theoretically that when firms can
sign long-term contracts, they fully insure their work force and o er fixed wage
contracts even in the presence of demand shocks. Yet empirically income pro-
cesses feature growth and employment risks (Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos,
2009; Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri, 2009).
Empirical evidence for the transmission of firms’ shocks to workers’ wages is
provided by Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005). Using employer-employee
matched data from Italy, they estimate how permanent and transitory pro-
ductivity shocks of firms enter the wage equation of continuing workers. They
report that full insurance of firms permanent shocks is rejected by the data.
Their paper, however, uses a sample of continuing workers and does not con-
trol directly for the selection of workers in and out of firms. If workers who
su er the most from a drop in firm performance are also the ones leaving the
sample, the e ect of firm shocks is underestimated. Roys (2011) uses French
firm data to estimate a model with homogenous workers and firm adjustment
costs. He finds that firm permanent shocks a ect employment and transitory
shocks a ect wages. The result however might be driven by the assumption
that wages are set according to Nash bargaining which means that they are
continuously renegotiated.
Contract theory o ers answers to the apparent failure of the first best al-
location. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) show that in a competitive market
without worker commitment firms continue to insure against downward risk
but have to increase the wage whenever productivity increases in order to re-
tain the worker. Thomas and Worrall (1988) introduce the idea of a shock
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to job productivity by developing a model where a match between a firm and
worker enjoy rents that can vary over time. They derive the optimal contract
in an environment where the outside option is exogenous and show that, in a
way similar to Harris and Holmstrom (1982), the wage remains constant until
either the firm’s or the worker’s participation constraint binds. Burdett and
Coles (2003) and Shi (2009) characterize the optimal contract when outside
o ers come from competing firms and the worker’s decision is private; firms of-
fer wages that increase with tenure to retain workers even-though they are risk
averse and would prefer flat wages. Menzio and Shi (2010) extends this equi-
librium framework by reintroducing match shocks and aggregate fluctuations,
but do not characterize the optimal contract. Schaal (2010) does characterize
the contract in a similar model but with homogeneous risk neutral workers. ?
derives the optimal contract with two sided lack of commitment but without
on-the-job search or any private action from the worker, wage changes when
outside options bind. To my knowledge, the current paper is the first to char-
acterize the long term optimal contract o ered in equilibrium by firms in an
economy with search frictions, on-the-job search, firm and worker shocks and
risk averse workers.
This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, I
document new findings about the co-movement of wages among co-workers
which suggests larger transmission of firm shocks to wages than previously re-
ported. Second, I characterize the optimal contract o ered by competing firms
in a directed-search equilibrium. Third, I estimate and evaluate quantitatively
the model using linked employer-employee data.
The model builds on the directed search equilibrium of Menzio and Shi
(2009), which allows for stochastic heterogeneity of firms and workers as well
as worker risk aversion. Workers can search for new positions when employed
and when unemployed. When on the job, the search decision is not observed
and outside o ers are not contractible by the firm. Firms can commit to any
history-contingent long-term contract but the worker can walk away at any
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time. This contract flexibility is crucial because picking a particular form
of wage setting might impose a specific level of insurance between the firm
and the worker, whereas here it is determined by profit maximization. Flows
of workers into firms is modeled using directed search, when searching for a
new job, workers observe all contract o ers and choose one to apply to. Each
contract has a queue associated with it and each worker chooses the queue that
maximizes the product between the return of the contract and the probability
of getting picked from that queue. Directed search is a very natural extension
of the competitive labour market that directly generates all the endogenous
movement of workers in, out and across firms2.
I show that in equilibrium firms post contracts that can be represented
by a target wage that corresponds to the certainty equivalent of the current
match productivity. Wages below that target wage will increase and wages
above will decrease. The optimal contract presented here shares features of
both Burdett and Coles (2003) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997): firms
back-load wages to incentivize workers to search less when profits are positive
and front-load wages when profits are negative to incentivize the worker to
search for a better position. When the match experiences a negative shock,
the firm does not want to layo  the worker right away and decides to insure
her in way similar to an optimal unemployment insurance scheme.
The empirical strategy of this paper utilizes the property that the wage
smoothly tracks the target wage, which is subject to both worker and firm pro-
ductivity shocks. Assuming that shocks to the worker and shocks to the firm
are independent and that co-workers share the same firm productivity, shocks
to the firm should a ect all workers, whereas idiosyncratic shocks should a ect
them in an uncorrelated way. Using the auto-covariance and co-variance of
co-workers’ wages, I can identify how much of the wage movement is due to
the firm relative to the worker and estimate the productivity process of both.
In Section 1, I present auxiliary models that will be used for estimation.
2The pioneering work in directed search is due to (Montgomery, 1991; Peters, 1991; Moen,
1997; Shimer, 1996; Burdett, Shi, and Wright, 2001; Shimer, 2001).
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This section also motivates the economic question with evidence of risk trans-
mission at the firm level in the Swedish matched employer-employee data. In
Section 2 I formally present the equilibrium search model and I characterize
the optimal contract. In Section 3, I present the estimation strategy and I dis-
cuss the identification of the model. This section also reports the estimation
results. In Section 4, I put the model to work to answer the question of how
much of income uncertainty is due to worker shocks and how much is due to
the firm. A summary of the notation and all proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 Earnings dynamics and participation
3.2.1 Data
The employer-employee matched data from Sweden links three administrative
data-sets: the employment data, the firm data and the benefits data that track
workers who are currently unemployed. The sample runs from 1993 to 2007
and covers around 6 million individuals. The firm data covers around 100,000
firms in four industries. The sample only covers firms with more than 10
employees, which means that some workers covered in the data work in a firm
for which we do not have an identifier. On the worker side, all self-employed
are dropped from the original sample, as well as some specific industries such as
fisheries and the financial sector. I first de-trend the data with time dummies
to remove any non stationary e ects. I select individuals under 50 years of
age, and, for moments computed at the firm level, I limit the data to firms
with at least 25 employees.
3.2.2 Wage growth for job-stayers
In order to give an intuitive interpretation to moments computed from the
data I introduce the following statistical model for residual log earnings of
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HS dropout HS grad Some college
residual wage variation ‡2w 0.1274 0.1159 0.2033
(0.000208) (0.000132) (0.000338)
worker transitory ‡2v 0.0128 0.0123 0.014
(0.000158) (0.000117) (0.000179)
worker permanent ‡2› 0.0198 0.0173 0.0193
(0.000238) (0.000161) (0.000242)
co-worker permanent ‡2” 0.0012 0.00146 0.00174
(3.83e-05) (3.11e-05) (4.93e-05)
shared by co-workers 6.07% 8.41% 8.97%
(0.19) (0.173) (0.309)
equivalent lottery ±3.47% ±3.82% ±4.17%
(0.0555) (0.0407) (0.0591)
Standard errors are computed using clustered resampling. Wage di erences are taken year on year.
The equivalent lottery represents fair lottery over a permanent wage raise or cut in percent that
would be equivalent to the share of variance common to co-workers.
Table 3.1. Residual income variance
continuing workers :
wijt = —Zt + w˜ijt + vijt
w˜ijt = w˜ijt≠1 + ”jt + ›ijt,
where i is the individual, j is the firm and t is time. Zt is a yearly dummy,
w˜ijt is the permanent wage, ›ijt is an idiosyncratic permanent shock to the
wage and ”jt is a permanent shock shared by all the workers in firm j. Wage
growth shared by co-worker should be thought of as a firm specific event. The
model parameters can be estimated using simple moments from individual
wage growth and average wage growth within a firm (See Appendix 3.A.1). I
report the estimates for each education group in Table 3.1.
The value of ‡” is of interest as it represents the risk that co-workers
share. To understand its monetary value, it is useful to think of the equivalent
lottery that delivers a permanent percentage wage raise or cut. For instance
for college graduates, every year, co-workers in a firm face the same lottery
draw that delivers with 50 percent chance a wage raise of 4.17 percent and
with 50 percent chance a 4.17 percent wage cut. This wage growth lottery
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HS dropout HS grad Col grad
· 0.0287*** 0.0217*** 0.0181***
(0.000955) (0.000643) (0.000679)
equivalent lottery ±0.537%*** ±0.453%*** ±0.399%***
(0.0179) (0.0134) (0.015)
Standard errors are computed using clustered resampling. Wage di erences are taken year on year.
The equivalent lottery represents fair lottery over a permanent wage raise or cut in percent that
would be equivalent to the share of variance common to co-workers.
Table 3.2. Income variance and value added shocks
is permanent and consequently 4.17 percent is economically significant. This
provides evidence that part of the wage growth uncertainty is shared at the
firm level.
3.2.3 Wage growth and value added
Quantitatively, the numbers presented in the previous section are larger than
the one reported previously in the literature that focused on the link between
value added and wages such as Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) and
Roys (2011). I replicate here a procedure similar to those papers to compare
the Swedish economy to the French and Italian ones. I consider a simple unit-
root model for the log value added per worker. The innovation shock µjt is
then linked to the shock of permanent income among co-workers ”jt from the
previous section by the parameter · :
yjt = —Xt + y˜jt + ujt
y˜jt = y˜jt≠1 + µjt
”jt = ·µjt + ‹jt
Table 3.2 contains the estimates for · for each eduction group as well as
the equivalent lottery implied by the amount of log wage growth uncertainty
explained by shocks to value added. As in Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi
(2005) we see that the link between value added and wages is significantly
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di erent from zero. This provides evidence against the hypothesis of full in-
surance of firm shocks. The magnitude of the transmission of value added
shocks to worker is economically small and similar to the values reported pre-
viously in the literature. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggest that shocks to value added
can only explain a small part of the risk co-workers jointly share at the firm
level. Consequently, I will focus the empirical analysis on wages within the
firms rather than on value added.
3.2.4 Worker transitions
Finally it is also of interest to measure how changes at the firm level a ect
transitions of workers to unemployment and to other firms. When a firm
receives a bad productivity shock, transitioning to another firm is a good
way to insure income. This is precisely why studying the impact of search
friction on the provision of insurance is important. Table 3.3 reports a linear
probability models of worker transitions to unemployment and to other firms.
Regressors include the mean wage of the firm and the mean wage change in
the firm.
First we see that the mean wage in the firm a ects negatively both transi-
tions. This suggests that better firms pay higher wages and keep their workers
longer. Interestingly however the worker’s wage a ects positively the proba-
bility to change firms. This can be explained by the fact that higher wages
are more di cult to increase to prevent the worker form leaving, or it could
be that higher earners move more frequently. We also note that an increase
in firm average wage while keeping worker’s wage constant a ects positively
the mobility of the worker. The results from Table 3.3 tell us that the risk of
job loss is a ected by changes in the firm. Not only do firms that pay higher
wage seem to retain their workers longer, it also seems that a change in the
firm’s average wage does a ect the rate at which workers loose their job. This
source of risk associated with job loss can’t be captured by the log wage mod-
els presented in the previous section that only looked at continuing workers.
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to another firm to unemployment
HS dropout HS grad Col grad HS dropout HS grad Col grad
(Intercept) 0.0134*** 0.0185*** 0.0245*** 0.0163*** 0.0154*** 0.0101***
(0.000118) (6.48e-05) (0.000107) (0.000124) (5.74e-05) (6.76e-05)
worker wage 0.0329*** 0.0468*** 0.028*** -0.0142*** -0.0033*** -0.00178***
(0.000386) (0.000219) (0.00027) (0.000408) (0.000194) (0.000171)
firm wage change 0.0162*** 0.0165*** 0.0035*** 0.0186*** 0.0208*** 0.0202***
(0.00122) (0.000782) (0.0011) (0.00129) (0.000693) (0.000695)
firm wage -0.032*** -0.0522*** -0.0281*** -0.0115*** -0.0222*** -0.0132***
(0.000673) (0.000422) (0.000494) (0.00071) (0.000374) (0.000312)
N 2,450,855 9,788,831 4,246,564 2,450,855 9,788,831 4,246,564
Table 3.3: Transition probabilities to unemployment and other jobs
The model introduced in the rest of the paper will account for this additional
employment risk.
3.3 The model
I present here an equilibrium model with search frictions and private worker
actions. The key feature of the model is to embed the bilateral relationship
between the firm and the worker, with productivity uncertainty, inside a com-
petitive search equilibrium where firms compete to attract and retain workers.
In this model, ex-ante identical firms compete by posting long-term con-
tracts to attract heterogeneous workers. Employed and unemployed workers
observe the menu of contracts o ered in equilibrium and decide which one to
apply to. This process forms sub-markets of workers applying to particular
contracts and firms o ering them. Within each queue the matching between
firms and workers is random. When choosing which sub-market to participate
in, both firms and workers take into account the value of matching and the
probability of matching. This probability is driven by how many firms and
workers participate in a particular sub-market.
When matched, the contract specifies the wage after each possible history
of shocks for the firm and workers. Given his wage profile, the worker chooses
which sub-market to visit while employed and chooses e ort, which directly
a ects the probability the current match remains intact. Both of these actions
are private and so unobserved by the firm. Firms take this into account and
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post contracts that incentivize the worker’s action in an optimal way. This
will mean that in some cases the wage will adjust downward albeit in a smooth
way. I now formally introduce the model.
3.3.1 Environment
Agents and preferences
Time is discrete, indexed by t and continues for ever. The economy is com-
posed of a discrete uniform distribution of infinitely lived workers with ability
indexed by x œ X = {x1, x2...xnx}. Workers want to maximize expected life-
time utility, E0
qŒ
t=0 —
t (u(wt)≠ c(et)) where utility of consumption u : Ræ R
is increasing and concave and cost of e ort c : R æ R is increasing and con-
vex with c(0) = 0. Worker’s ability x changes over time according to Markov
process  x(xt+1|xt). Unemployed workers receive flow value of unemployment
b(x). The other side of the market is composed of a uniform distribution of
ex-ante identical firms with active jobs and vacancies. Vacancies live for one
period and become active jobs if matched with a worker.
An active job is characterized by the current worker ability x and the
current match quality z. The match quality z evolves with an innovation ÿt
drawn at the firm level such that zt+1 = g(zt, ÿt). ÿt is a firm level shock
that a ects all continuing workers’ TFP. New hires all start with z = 0. The
function g(·, ·) is assumed to generate a monotonic transition rule. Every
period a match (xt, zt) has access to a technology that produces f(xt, zt).
Worker’s e ort e a ects the probability that the technology continues to exists
next period. This captures the idea that a negligent worker might loose a client
or break the machine and cause the job to disappear. The firm cares about
the total discounted expected profit of each created vacancy.
Firms here operate constant return to scale production functions and can
be thought of as one worker per firm. However, empirically one cannot aggre-
gate firms with the same output as the history of productivity shocks a ects
the distribution of workers. For instance whether or not a firm had a very bad
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shock in the last period will a ect the current distribution of workers beyond
the current productivity. To pin down the distribution of workers in a given
firm one needs to know the entire history of shocks.
Search markets
The meeting process between workers and firms vacancies is constrained by
search frictions. The labour market that matches workers to vacancies is
organized in a set of queues indexed by (x, v) œ X ◊ V where x is the type
of the worker and v is the value promised to her in that given queue. Firms
can choose in which (x, v) lines they want to open vacancies and workers can
choose in which v line associated with their type x they want to queue3. Each
visited sub-market is characterized by it’s tightness represented by the function
◊ : X ◊ V æ R+ which is the ratio of number of vacancies to workers. The
tightness captures the fact that a high ratio of vacancies to workers will make it
harder for firms to hire. In a directed search model like the one presented here,
the tightness is queue specific which means that di erent worker types could
be finding jobs at di erent rates. In queue (x, v) a worker of type x matches
with probability p(◊(x, v)) and receives utility v. Firms post vacancies at unit
cost ÷ and when posting in market (x, v) the vacancy is filled with probability
q(◊(x, v)). „(x, v) will denote the mass of vacancies created in market (x, v).
States and actions
A worker is either employed or unemployed and enters each period with a
given ability x. When unemployed she collects benefit b(x) and can search
every period. When searching she chooses which sub-market (x, v) to visit, in
which case she gets matched with probability p(◊(x, v)) and if matched joins
a job and receives lifetime utility v.
3Menzio and Shi (2009) Theorem 3 tells us that workers will separate by type in equi-
librium if markets are indexed by the value that each type x would get in a particular
sub-market (v = (v(x1), v(x2)...v(xnx)) œ Rnx ,) and workers can apply to any. At equilib-
rium only a given type x visits a particular market. This market can then be represented
directly by (x, v) as done in the current paper.
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Figure 3.1: within period time line
An employed worker is part of a match and starts the period with a given
ability level x and a current match quality z. The period is then divided in
four stages as illustrated in Figure 3.1, first is production, the firm collects
output f(x, z) and pays the wage w to the worker. The worker cannot save,
consumes all of w, chooses e ort e and gets flow utility u(w) ≠ c(e). With
probability (1≠ ”(e)), where ”(e) is decreasing in e, the employment persists
to the next period. With probability ”(e) the worker moves to unemployment.
In the search stage, the worker is allowed to search with e ciency Ÿ. When
searching she chooses which sub-market (x, v) to visit and gets matched with
probability Ÿp(◊(x, v)). If matched she moves to a new match where she will
enjoy v and the current job will be destroyed. If the worker is not matched
to a new job, the current job persists, a new xÕ is drawn conditional on the
old one, and a firm level shock ÿ is drawn to update z. In summary, in every
period an active job chooses the wage w, and the worker chooses e ort e and
which sub-market (x, v) to search in. Because c(0) = 0 the worker can quit
in every period if the firm does not promise enough. By choosing v and e the
worker controls his transition to other jobs and to unemployment.
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Informational structure and contracts
A contract defines the transfer and actions for the worker and the firm within
a match for all future histories. Call s· = (x· , z· ) œ S = X ◊ R the state of
the match · periods in the future and call s· = (s1...s· ) œ S· a given history
of realizations between s1 the state today and s· , the state in · periods.
The history of productivity is common knowledge to the worker and the
firm and fully contractible. However the worker’s actions are private infor-
mation and transitions to other firms or to unemployment are assumed to be
not contractible. This rules out side payments as well as countering outside
o ers4. Here, the contract o ered by the firm to the worker is then represented
by:
C := (w,‡); with w := {w· (s· )}Œ·=0 , and ‡ := {v· (s· ), e· (s· )}Œ·=0, (3.1)
I explicitly separate the firm’s choice from the worker’s response. The firm
chooses the wage w· paid at every history and the worker responds by choos-
ing (v· , e· ) the search and e ort decision5. ‡ can be thought as the action
suggested by the contract and I will focus on contracts where the recommen-
dation is incentive compatible. The contract space is completely flexible in the
way it responds to tenure and any productivity history. In particular it leaves
the firm free to chose how the wage should respond to productivity shock,
which is the central question of this paper.
3.3.2 Worker choice
An unemployed worker of type x chooses optimally which sub-market (x, v0)
she applies to. The only value she cares about is the value she will get,
specifically v0 and the tightness of the market ◊(x, v0). Higher v0 sub-markets
4Lentz (2013) develops a model with optimal contracts and countering of outside o ers,
but without productivity shocks, and shows that firms continue to backload wages.
5Derivations will later require a randomization which means that the contract can specify
simple probability over actions instead of actions themselves. This is left implicit at this point
but will be clarified in the recursive formulation of the problem.
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deliver higher values but have longer average waiting times. I can write the
value U(x) of being unemployed as follows:
U(x) = sup
v0œR
b(x) + —p(◊(x, v0))v0 + — (1≠ p(◊(x, v0)))ExÕ|xU(xÕ). (W-BE)
We follow by writing the problem of the employed worker and the firm as
a recursive contract. As presented in Spear and Srivastava (1987) the state
space is augmented with V , the promised utility to the worker. The recursive
contract is characterized at each (x, z, V ) by {ﬁi, wi, ei, v1i,WixÕzÕ}i=1,2 where
ﬁi : S ◊ V æ [0, 1] is a randomization, wi : S ◊ V æ R+ is the wage, ei :
S ◊ V æ [0, e¯] is e ort choice, vi : S ◊ V æ [0, v¯] is the search choice and
WixÕzÕ : S ◊ (X ◊ R) æ V is the utility promised for each realization next
period.
The worker optimally chooses the action (v, e), when promised next period
expected utility W = ExÕzÕWxÕzÕ , she solves the following problem:
sup
v,e
u(w)≠c(e)+”(e)—ExÕ|xU(xÕ)+(1≠”(e))—Ÿp(◊(x, v))v+—(1≠”(e))(1≠Ÿp(◊(x, v)))W,
for which we define the associated worker policies vú : X ◊ V æ [0, v¯] and
eú : X ◊ V æ [0, e¯]. Because of the properties of p(·), ◊(·, ·) and c(·), those
functions are uniquely defined. Note that those policies only depend on the
promised utility for next period and not on the current (zt, V ) as stated in the
following definition.
Definition 5. We defined the composite transition probabilities p˜ : X◊Væ R
and the utility return to the worker r˜ : X◊V æ R as functions of the promised
utility W (using short-hand eú = eú(x,W ) and vú = vú(x,W )):
p(x,W ) =Ÿ(1≠ ”(eú)) (1≠ p(◊(x, vú1))) (3.2)
r˜(x,W ) =≠ c(eú) + —Ÿ (1≠ ”(eú)) p(◊(x, vú1)) (vú1 ≠W ) (3.3)
+ ”(eú)—ExÕ|xU(xÕ) + — (1≠ ”(eú))W. (3.4)
(3.5)
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These functions capture everything the firm needs to know about the con-
sequences of setting the wage dynamically. We now turn to the firm’s problem.
3.3.3 Firm profit, optimal contracting problem
I can now describe the firm problem in terms of promised utilities. The firm
chooses a lottery over promised values and wages which then determines the
participation probabilities. The expected profit of a match to the firm can be
expressed recursively as
J (x, z, V ) = sup
ﬁi,wi,Wi,WixÕzÕ
ÿ
i=1,2
ﬁi
!
f(x, z)≠ wi + —p˜(x,Wi)ExÕzÕJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕzÕ)
"
s.t V =
ÿ
i
ﬁi (u(wi) + r˜(x,Wi)) , (BE-F)
Wi = EWixÕzÕ ,
ÿ
ﬁi = 1.
The firm chooses the current period wage wi and the promised utilities WixÕzÕ
for each lottery realization i and state of (xÕ, zÕ) tomorrow. These control
variables must be chosen to maximize expected returns subject to the promise
keeping constraint. This constraint makes sure that the choices of the firm
honors the promise made in previous periods to deliver the value V to the
worker. The right hand side of the constraint is the lifetime utility of the
worker given the choices made by the firm. The lottery is present only to
insure concavity of the function.
The incentive compatibility of the worker is embedded in the r˜ and p˜
functions that we defined previously. By increasing future promises the firm
can increase the probability that the match continues. However at given V ,
larger promised utilities go together with lower current wage w. Since the
utility function is concave, there will be a point where too low of a wage is
just not e cient. This is the classic insurance incentive tradeo .
Finally firms choose how many vacancies to open in each (x, v) market.
Given vacancy creation cost ÷ and the fact that the match quality z starts at
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0, the return to opening a vacancy is given by:
 0(x, V ) = q(◊(x, V ))J (x, 0, V )≠ ÷,
and firms will open vacancies in a given market if and only if expected profit
is positive. The vacancy creation cost is linear, which means that if  0 is
positive the firm will create an infinity of vacancies, if it’s negative it won’t
create any and if it’s zero the firm is indi erent.
3.3.4 Equilibrium definition
Free entry condition
We now impose a free entry condition on the market. Firms will open vacancies
in each markets until the the expected profit is zero or negative:
’(x, V ) œ X◊ V :  0(x, V ) Æ 0. (EQ1)
This will pin down the tightness of each market. „(x, v) will denote the total
mass of vacancies posted in market (x.v).
Market clearing
Markets for labour must clear, in the sense that the equilibrium distribution
must be generated by the equilibrium decisions. Given an equilibrium sta-
tionary distribution h(x, y, z, V ) of workers assigned to matches with a given
promised utility, given the mass „(x, V ) of vacancies, the following clearing
condition must be satisfied:
’x, v „(x, v) = ◊(x, v)
Ë
u(x)1[vú0(x) = v]
+
ÿ
xœX
⁄
z
⁄
V Õ
ÿ
i
ﬁi(x, z, V Õ)1[vúi (x,Wi) = v] dH(x, z, V Õ)
È
. (EQ2)
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There is one last market clearing equation for „ and it states that „ in the next
period is consistent with itself, all the equilibrium decisions, and law motions
such as the shocks on x, z and the endogenous separation. This is left for the
appendix.
Definition 6. A stationary competitive search equilibrium is defined
by a mass of vacancies „(x, v) across sub-markets (x, v), a tightness ◊(x, v) œ
R, an active job distribution h(x, z, V ) and an optimal contract policy › =
{ﬁi, wi, ei, vj ,WixÕzÕ}i=1,2 such that:
(a) › solves the firm optimal contract problem BE-F and so satisfies worker
incentive compatibility.
(b) ◊(x, v) and „(x, v) satisfy the free entry condition EQ1 for all (x, v)
(c) ◊(x, v), „(x, v) and h(x, z, V ) solve the market clearing condition EQ2
(d) h(x, z, V ) is generated by „(x, v) and ›
The equilibrium assigns workers to firms with contracts in a way where
neither workers or firms have an incentive to deviate. The distributions „ and
h represent the equilibrium allocation.
3.3.5 Equilibrium and contract characterization
Lemma 17 (existence). A stationary competitive search equilibrium exists.
Proof. See appendix 3.B.1
Menzio and Shi (2010) gives us the important results that a block recursive
equilibrium exists in the version of this model with aggregate shocks and no
worker e ort or heterogeneity, and Tsuyuhara (2013) proves the existence with
e ort but without shocks or firm heterogeneity. The existence continues to be
true when the incentive problem and the shocks are combined. The equilibrium
is also well defined when adding aggregate shocks.
Lemma 18. The Pareto frontier J (x, z, V ) is continuously di erentiable, de-
creasing and concave with respect to V and increasing in z.
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Proof. See appendix 3.B.3
Concavity is a direct implication of the use of the lottery. I then adapt the
su cient condition from Koeppl (2006) for di erentiability in two-sided limited
commitment models. From the free entry condition, the tightness function is
a continuously di erentiable and concave function of J (x, z, V ), which implies
that the composite search function p(◊(x, v)) inherits those properties for all
x œ X.
I am interested in how firms decide to compensate workers over time given
that they face the classic trade-o  between insurance and incentives. The fol-
lowing proposition provides a clear prediction for how wages move dependent
on the current state of the match:
Theorem 2 (optimal contract). For each viable match (x, z), independent
of the lottery realization, the wage policy is characterized by a target wage
wú(x, z), which is increasing in z such that:
wt Æ wú(xt, zt) ∆ wt Æ wt+1 Æ wú(xt, zt) incentive to search less
wt Ø wú(xt, zt) ∆ wú(xt, zt) Æ wt+1 Æ wt incentive to search more
where the target wage is characterized by the zero expected profit condition for
the firm:
’x, z ExÕzÕ|xzJ (xÕ, zÕ,WxÕzÕ) = 0
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.4.
The optimal contract links wages to productivity. For all histories of
shocks, the change in wage growth will be in the direction of the target wage
which is itself tied to the productivity of the match. This means that workers’
wages will respond to any shock a ecting the expected productivity (Figure
3.2 shows an example wage path). In particular it will respond to both worker
specific and firm productivity shocks. The exact change in the wage is char-
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Figure 3.2: Wage and target wage example
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Notes: This figure represents the target wage (dotted blue) and the
actual wage (plain blue) for a worker. The red line represents a second
worker sharing same firm specific shocks, but a di erent worker specific
productivity.
acterized by the first order conditions of the firm problem (BE-F) and reads:
’x, z, xÕ, zÕ p˜v(x,Wi)
p˜(x,Wi)
· EzÕÕyÕÕJ (xÕÕ, zÕÕ,WixÕÕzÕÕ) = 1uÕ(wxÕzÕ) ≠
1
uÕ(w) .
The right hand side represents the change in marginal utilities and tells us
that risk aversion a ects how rapidly wages adjust. On the left hand-side the
first term represents the severity of the moral-hazard problem and the second
term is the discounted expected profit of the firm. This expression resembles
the main equation in Rogerson (1985) and captures the incentive problem the
firm is facing when paying the worker. When in a match the worker and the
firm are part of a locally monopolistic bilateral relationship as in the original
paper. However, the incentive problem here is precisely on the availability of
the outside option. In Rogerson (1985), workers e ort a ects the output of
the match whereas here, the e ort a ects its duration and the availability of
outside options.
The fact that wages adjust downward even though firms can commit is the
consequence of the existence of rents and the presence of an incentive problem.
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Figure 3.3: productivity and wages with rents, lack of commitment and
incentive problems
In a competitive market without rents and with full commitment, even in the
presence of productivity uncertainty, the firm will fully insure workers and the
wage will be constant until the relationship is exogenously destroyed. The
wage paid to the worker is the certainty equivalent of the present value of the
firm output.
Harris and Holmstrom (1982) show that when allowing for only one-sided
limited commitment, the wage will have to adjust when worker’s productivity
increases so as to retain her (Figure 3.3.a1). However negative shocks con-
tinue to be fully insured (Figure 3.3.a2). It is the lack of commitment that
prevents the firm from o ering the worker full insurance. Workers would want
to commit ex-ante but can’t and so the lack of commitment is a constraint,
not a relaxation.
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In the presence of rents the outside option of the worker and the produc-
tivity in the current match might vary separately. The outside option is linked
to characteristics the worker caries with her when she moves to another firm,
while the match rent also depends on the firm specific characteristics. Retain-
ing the worker only requires o ering more than her outside o er and and so
only depends on worker-specific characteristics. This means that with rents
only, the worker’s wage does not respond to firm specific productivity shocks
(Figure 3.3.b). Thomas and Worrall (1988) take the outside o ers and the
match rents as exogenous and add firm-side lack of commitment and show
that in that case downwards adjustment will happen when the firm partic-
ipation constraint binds. However in the interior region of the surplus, the
contract fully insures the worker and the wage is constant.
The final ingredient is the incentive problem (Figure 3.3.c) which implies
an unique e cient transfer from the firm to the worker instead of a full set.
The worker chooses where to search and applies to increasingly long queues
when promised higher values. Whenever the worker is getting less than the
total value of the match, she will tend to leave the current job with a higher
than e cient probability (inversely when the workers gets more, she does
not search enough). Ex-ante, it is more e cient to sign a contract that will
give up some of the insurance to come closer to the e cient worker decision.
This dynamic was fully described in the extreme case of bilateral monopoly
of Rogerson (1985) and continues to apply here in an equilibrium with firm
competition and rents.
The continuum of queues available to the worker in the directed search
equilibrium can be thought of as a probabilistic version of the constraint faced
by firms in Harris and Holmstrom (1982). In their competitive version workers
can find their v¯ with probability one, whereas with directed search they can
access any v Æ v¯ with decreasing probability p(v). In the presence of search
frictions the firm-worker relationship becomes a temporary bilateral monopoly
with an incentive problem determined by the equilibrium. As the strength of
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Figure 3.4: Meeting probability
the friction varies we get a continuum of contracts à la Rogerson (1985), with
the property that as search frictions vanish, the contract becomes Harris and
Holmstrom (1982) (See Figure 3.4).
Since rents and incentives are su cient for the transfer of firm shocks to
wages, search frictions are only one of several possible mechanisms. In the
present model, there are two sources of rents, search frictions and match spe-
cific TFP, and two incentive problems, on the job search and e ort choice e.
This means that even when frictions are completely shut down, we would still
see some firm level shocks in the earning dynamics6. Search frictions are an
interesting feature not only because they allow us to consider employment risk
but also because they generate both the rents and the incentive problem at the
same time. It is also interesting to note that the shape of the meeting proba-
bility function creates some downward rigidities as in Harris and Holmstrom
(1982).
Finally, firing never happens right away. First the firm decreases the wage
of the worker over time because forcing her to search elsewhere is the most
e ective way for the firm to deliver ex-ante utility. The firm, when attracting
the workers, can commit to paths where they keep the worker on payroll for
6I am in the process of estimating a frictionless version of the model on a subset of the
moments that should be included in future version.
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a given amount of time even though it means negative expected profit.
3.4 Estimation
3.4.1 Model specification and identification
I estimate the model using indirect inference and a parametrized model. I
present in Table 3.4 the specification I use in the next sections. I use the con-
stant relative risk aversion utility function. The discount rate for the worker
and the interest rate for the firm are set to an annual 5% and the model
is solved quarterly. The production function is parametrized by “a a scale
parameter, “z and “x that control the dispersions in ability and match pro-
ductivity. The worker e ort function is such that c(0) = 0, cÕ(·) > 0, cÕÕ(·) > 0
and limeæ1 c(e) =Œ. For the time being I set the flow value of unemployment
to 30 percent of the starting productivity and I fix c1 = 0.3 and “z = 1. I
normalize the mean wage in the economy which pins down the value of “a. I
also set an absolute lower bound of ≠f(x¯, z0)/(10 · r) on the negative surplus
that firms can commit to. This leaves 6 parameters to estimate as shown in
Table 3.6.
The vacancy cost ÷ a ects the meeting rate through the free entry condition
(EQ1) and Ÿ a ects the relative e ciency of on-the-job search. The probability
of exiting unemployment and the probability of job-to-job transitions pin down
÷ and Ÿ.
The e ort cost function c(·) a ects both the average rate at which workers
loose their jobs and how this rates is linked to their current wage. c0 and c1
can be measured by fitting the slope and intercept of a logistic regression on
the probability of employment to unemployment (E2U) transition conditional
on current wage.
The parameter “x of the production function a ects the return to worker
ability x. Normalizing x to be uniform on [0, 1] (at discrete uniformly spaced
support), the production function f can be interpreted as the quantile function
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matching function p(◊) = ◊(1≠ ◊‹)≠1/‹
utility function u(w) = w1≠Î1≠Î
production function f(x, z) = “a · exp
!
“z ≠1(z) + “x ·  ≠1(x)
"
worker cost function c(e) = c0 ((1≠ e)≠c1 ≠ 1)
”(e) = 1≠ e
unemployment benefits b(x) = f(x,Qz(b))
worker type  x(xt+1|xt) is a Gaussian copula with parameter ﬂx
match TFP  z(zt+1|zt) is a Gaussian copula with parameter ﬂz
updates to zt are computed via ÿt shared at firm level
Table 3.4: functional form specifications
of worker specific heterogeneity. Using the normal distribution  ≠1 gives the
simple interpretation that workers’ productivity is distributed as a log-normal
distribution with log-variance “x. The mean of that distribution is defined by
“a which, as mentioned before, is normalized to match the mean log-wage in
the economy.
The parameter of risk aversion controls how quickly changes in productivity
get transmitted into wage changes. Every else kept equal, matching the total
value added growth variance and the total wage growth variance within the
firm gives an indication of how risk averse workers are.
Finally let’s consider the parameters of the worker and match productiv-
ity processes. The values of ﬂx and ﬂz are learned from the variance of wage
growth and the auto-covariance of wage growth among co-workers. The sta-
tistical model presented in the first section of the paper illustrates how the
growth variance of worker is composed of both the worker specific growth
and the firm specific growth and that the auto-covariance between co-workers’
wage growth is mostly due to the common firm specific innovation. Match-
ing both workers’ wage growth variance and co-variance between co-workers
allows to pin down ﬂx and ﬂz.
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3.4.2 Solving the model
The model is estimated by method of simulated moments. For each parameter
value I solve for the equilibrium, which is then used to simulate a representative
sample. I create the moments from the simulated data and compute the
weighted distance between the simulated moments and the moments measured
from the Swedish data.
This approach requires resolving the model for each parameter set. I use
a nested fixed point method where I jointly solve for the worker’s problem,
the firm’s problem and the equilibrium constraint. The main di culty resides
in solving the firm problem where tackling directly (BE-F) requires finding
the promised utilities WzÕxÕ in each state of the world for the next period.
This becomes infeasible as soon as reasonable supports are considered for X
and Z. However, the first order condition with respect to W reveals that the
utility promised in di erent states are linked to each other. Call ⁄—p(x,W )
the multiplier for the W = qWzÕxÕ constraint, then the first order condition
for WxÕzÕ is
ˆJ
ˆV
(xÕ, zÕ,WxÕ,zÕ) = ⁄,
where given ⁄, if J is strictly concave, then all the WxÕzÕ are pinned down.
This reduces the search to one dimension. The simplification comes from the
fact that the firm always tries to insure the worker as much as possible across
future states, and does this by keeping her marginal utility constant across
realizations. Indeed, we know that the derivative of J is the inverse marginal
utility. One di culty however is that J might be weakly concave in some
regions. In that case one needs to keep track of a set of possible feasible
promised utilities WxÕzÕ . Given the concavity of J this set will be an interval
fully captured by its two extremities. This means that at worst the number
of the control variables is augmented by one.
Using the marginal utility in the state space is known as the recursive
Lagrangian approach as developed by Kocherlakota (1996); Marcet and Ma-
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rimon (2011); Messner, Pavoni, and Sleet (2011); Cole and Kubler (2012).
The problem of non-strict concavity persists in this formulation but Cole and
Kubler (2012) show how to overcome this di culty by keeping track of the
upper and lower bound of the set of solutions. Numerically I solve the firm
problem using recursive Lagrangian and do not find any such flat region. The
recursive Lagrangian for the firm problem is derived in Appendix 3.B.6 and is
given by:
P(x, z, ﬂ) = inf
“
sup
w,W
f(x, z)≠ w + ﬂ (u(wi) + r˜(x,W ))
≠ —“p˜(x,W ) + —p˜(x,W )EP(xÕ, zÕ, “), (3.6)
where
P(x, z, ﬂ) := sup
v
J (x, z, v) + ﬂv.
3.4.3 Estimation and standard errors (Preliminary)
Estimation of the parameters is achieved using a minimum distance estimator
based on a set of moments mn. The method is close to simulated moments,
however because of the moments are based on individual data and some are
based on aggregation at the firm level, I present it as an indirect inference
estimator.
Definition 7. Given a vector mn of moments such that
Ô
n (mn ≠m(◊0)) dæ
N (0, ) where ◊0 is the true parameter, and for a given weighting matrix
Wn = O(1) , I define the following criterion:
Ln(◊) = ≠n2 [mn ≠m(◊)]
T Wn [mn ≠m(◊)] ,
and the associated minimum distance estimate ◊ˆn = inf◊ Ln(◊).
Because some of the moments are defined at the firm level, such as the
correlation between co-worker wage growth, n refers to the number of firms.
Point estimates are computed using a parallel version of di erential evolution,
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see Das and Suganthan (2011) for a complete survey. In the first stage I use
a weighting matrix constructed from the inverse diagonal of an estimate from
the data of   which ignores the serial correlation and the fact that the same
worker appears in several firms:
Wn =
1
diag
Ë
 ˆ
È2≠1
.
The computation of standard errors is based on the pseudo-likelihood es-
timator presented in Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). Using MCMC rejection
sampling, I can perform the estimation in parallel, without having to compute
derivatives and still obtain standard errors on the parameters. Given the cri-
terion Ln(◊), with moments mn, true parameter ◊0 and weighting matrix Wn,
the asymptotic variance for the minimum distance estimator ◊ˆn is distributed
according to
Ô
n
1‚◊n ≠ ◊02 dæ N (◊0, J≠1 J≠1)
where
  = limnæŒ
5
ˆm(◊0)
ˆ◊T
6T
Wn Wn
ˆm(◊0)
ˆ◊T
J = limnæŒ
1
n
ˆ2Ln(◊)
ˆ◊Tˆ◊
The full procedure requires two steps. In a first step I acquire a consistent
estimate of ◊ˆn using an approximate weighting matrix  ˆn using bootstrap.
Given a good value of ◊ˆn I compute a Markov chain from the posterior of the
pseudo likelihood of Ln(◊) as described Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) and
extended to parallel chains as presented in Baragatti, Grimaud, and Pommeret
(2011). The Markov chain allows construction of an estimate of   and J≠1.
J≠1 is obtained by taking the variance covariance matrix of the parameters
generated by the chain.   can be computed by finite di erences around the
optimal value ◊ˆn by selecting draws from the chain that are close to it. A
consistent estimate of   can then be constructed by simulating the model at
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HS dropout HS grad Some college
model data model data model data
PrU2E 0.131 0.152 0.214 0.184 0.209 0.191(2.69e-04) (1.53e-04) (3.36e-04)
PrJ2J 0.0224 0.0223 0.0284 0.0267 0.0338 0.0331(4.01e-05) (2.27e-05) (3.21e-05)
PrE2U 0.0202 0.0249 0.0199 0.0223 0.0164 0.0143(6.25e-05) (2.67e-05) (3.05e-05)
E(  logwit|EE) 0.0145 0.0125 0.03 0.0153 0.0257 0.0335
(1.73e-04) (8.69e-05) (1.24e-04)
E(  logwit|J2J) 0.0329 0.0274 0.0738 0.0306 0.0875 0.0506
(8.36e-04) (3.95e-04) (5.60e-04)
V ar(logwit) 0.163 0.127 0.141 0.116 0.204 0.203
(2.09e-04) (1.32e-04) (3.38e-04)
V ar(  logwit|EE) 0.0186 0.0198 0.0171 0.0173 0.0173 0.0193
(2.38e-05) (1.61e-05) (2.42e-05)
V ar(  logwit|J2J) 0.0448 0.0206 0.0353 0.018 0.0466 0.0186
(5.36e-04) (2.14e-04) (2.49e-04)
V ar(  log yit) 0.375 0.103 0.158 0.119 0.102 0.132
(1.24e-03) (1.10e-03) (1.65e-03)
Cov(  logwit,  logwjt|EE) 0.00154 0.00126 0.00169 0.00167 0.0023 0.00235
(2.64e-06) (1.80e-06) (3.32e-06)
Table 3.5: Within sample model fit (Preliminary)
◊ˆn and computing the covariance matrix.
3.4.4 Moments and estimates
I present here the set of moments used for estimation on the di erent educa-
tion groups. Table 3.5 reports the moments in the data with their measured
standard deviation and the value of the moments in the model at the es-
timated parameter values. Table 3.6 presents the estimated parameters for
each education group.
The model matches transition probabilities and variances quite precisely
across education groups. However at this time the model performs poorly on
the average wage growth on the job and the mean wage gain on job-to-job
transitions. Those moments are related to each other because the job-to-job
transition rate, mean gain on moving and on the job mean wage growth are
linked to each other because wages increase on-the-job to lower the worker
search decision. This is a common limitation of search model which suggests
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HS dropout HS grad Some college
scale (log wage) 0.127 10.4 10.4
(0.000209) (0.0003) (0.0003)
risk aversion Î 1.12 1.62 1.42
(0.124) (0.0408) (0.0586)
vacancy cost ÷≠1 1.34 0.646 0.605
(0.34) (0.0753) (0.0532)
OTJ e ciency Ÿ 0.586 0.617 0.687
(0.15) (0.0238) (0.0387)
e ort cost c0 0.0779 0.0498 0.0418
(0.0244) (0.0202) (0.0229)
worker heterogeneity “x 2.03 1.27 1.5
(0.303) (0.123) (0.0797)
worker type auto-cor ﬂx 0.749 0.802 0.879
(0.0365) (0.0206) (0.0274)
match type auto-cor ﬂz 0.765 0.962 0.978
(0.06) (0.0502) (0.0215)
Table 3.6: Parameter estimates (Preliminary)
that some human capital accumulation might be happening in the data. This
is absent from the current model.
3.5 Empirical implications
3.5.1 Decomposition of permanent wage growth
I can now utilize the model to decompose observed variances into better defined
welfare measures. Our concern is with the sources of uncertainty in the change
of lifetime utility, however to get measures in monetary form, I define the wage
growth variance of log permanent wage as:
Et (w¯t+1 ≠ w¯t)2 where w¯t := log
1
u≠1 (rWt)
2
,
where w¯ represents the annuity wage that delivers the current level of lifetime
utility, the permanent wage equivalent to the expected lifetime utility. This is
a meaningful measure since Wt includes all possible future risk of loosing the
job or the opportunities to find new ones. Similarly we can measure equivalent
permanent output that I will denote y¯. Considering employed workers, five
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mutually exclusive events can happen to them over the course of a period: i)
job loss, ii) job transition, iii) firm shock, iv) worker shock or v) none of the
above. We can decompose the permanent earning growth variance into the
contributions of those five events:
Et (w¯t+1 ≠ w¯t)2 =
5ÿ
i=1
p(evi) · Et
Ë
(w¯t+1 ≠ w¯t)2 |evi
È
=
5ÿ
i=1
Vi.
To get the average risk in the population, I integrate the Vi over the station-
ary distribution. Table 3.7 reports this variance decomposition for the three
education groups. Including p(evi) in the computation of Vi directly accounts
for the likelihood of the event.
To get an idea of the overall underlying uncertainty I compute a pass
through measure that links the growth variance in productivity to the growth
variance in earnings:
Cov(w¯t+1 ≠ w¯t, y¯t+1 ≠ y¯t)
V ar(y¯t+1 ≠ y¯t)
and report this value conditional on receiving a worker shock and firm shock
and unconditional.
The results first tell us that the total uncertainty associated with mobility is
of the same magnitude as the uncertainty associated with productivity shocks.
For high school drop out mobility accounts for 50 percent of uncertainty and
for 24 percent for college graduates. Within mobility, job loss takes a bigger
share for high school drop outs than for college graduates. This seems intuitive
given the J2J and E2U transition rates of the two groups. Among job stayers,
firm productivity shocks represent the main source of uncertainty.
Finally the pass through measure indicates that even though di erent ed-
ucation group su er di erently from firm and worker shock in terms of total
earning uncertainty, the way in which those uncertainty transmit seems to be
the same. For both education groups, a 10 percent change productivity due
to a firm shock generates a 3 percent drop in permanent earnings. Similarly
a 10 percent drop in productivity due to a worker shocks translates into a 2
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HS dropout HS grad Some college
Growth variance shares
firm shock 4.6e-04 19.6% 1.5e-04 17.8% 3.1e-04 19.2%
worker shock 1.3e-03 54.2% 2.9e-04 34.5% 7.1e-04 44.4%
job change 1.7e-04 7.13% 1.2e-04 13.8% 1.8e-04 11.3%
job loss 4.2e-04 18.1% 2.8e-04 32.4% 3.9e-04 24.3%
no shock 2.3e-05 0.968% 1.2e-05 1.36% 1.5e-05 0.933%
Passthrough coe cents
overall 0.369 0.243 0.282
worker shock 0.388 0.179 0.215
firm shock 0.348 0.271 0.328
Table 3.7: Permanent wage growth variance decomposition
percent drop on average.
3.5.2 Policy analysis
I analyze the e ect of a revenue neutral government policy that redistributes
from high wages to lower wages. I parametrize the policy as follows:
w˜ = ⁄w 1· .
I use the highest education group for the analysis, fix ⁄ = 1.2 and solve for
· = 1.25 to make the policy revenue neutral. To get a better understanding
of the e ect of the policy, I report four sets of numbers: i) the model solved at
the estimated parameters, without any transfer, ii) use the same solution and
apply transfers without adjusting decisions, iii) solve the model again with
agents knowing about the transfers, and report pre-transfer moments and iv)
post-tax moments. Figure 3.5 represents graphically the transfer and Table
3.8 reports the computed results.
The goal of the policy is to reduce both the uncertainty in earnings growth
and the cross-sectional inequality. When applied directly on the equilibrium
solution we see that total log wage variance is reduced by 36%, and the wage
growth variance is reduced by 35%. However agents react to the introduction
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Agents do not expect transfers expect transfers
Transfers before after before after
Output 1 0.978
Unemployment 4.96% 4.69%
Total wage 1 0.992 0.962 0.961
Wage variance 0.205 0.131 0.238 0.152
Growth variance 0.0174 0.0111 0.021 0.0134
Table 3.8: Revenue neutral policy
of the policy in a way that attenuates its direct e ect. Re-solving the model
including those transfers gives a reduction in log wage variance of only 10%
and for wage growth of 30%.
The policy however also a ects unemployment which goes from 4.96%
to 4.56%. This happens because the policy makes lower productivity jobs
marginally more productive than without transfers, favoring workers coming
out of unemployment who apply to lower paying, highly accessible jobs. On
the other hand total output is reduced for a similar reason, worker reallocation
is not as critical and in the economy with transfers, worker will reallocate less
e ciently.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I study the di erent sources of uncertainty faced by workers
in the labour market. Workers are subject to individual productivity shocks
and their earnings may also be a ected by the performance of their employer
because of search frictions in the labour market. To understand the way shocks
get transmitted and how this might a ect welfare and labour market policy I
develop an equilibrium model with search frictions, risk averse workers, firm
and worker productivity shocks. In this model I show that the optimal contract
pays a wage that smoothly tracks the joint match productivity. This implies
that both worker and firm level shocks transmit to wages, albeit only partially.
In contrast to the perfectly competitive model, on one hand firm may insure
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workers’ productivity shocks but on the other hand they are able to transmit
firm level shocks to wages.
I estimate the model on matched employer-employee data to estimate the
relative importance of di erent sources of uncertainty. Firm productivity
shocks can account for 20% for the overall permanent wage uncertainty, leav-
ing mobility and worker shocks as the main sources of risk. Firms are unable
to insure workers once the employment relationship ends making publicly pro-
vided unemployment benefits an important source of insurance. To quantify
the underlying source of uncertainty I compute a pass-trough measure of pro-
ductivity shocks to earning shocks and find that 20% of worker shocks and
30% of firm shocks get transmitted to wages. The implication of those find-
ings is that policies should focus on transitions in and out of work. This is
because when employed the firm will provide some source of insurance, but
the firm can’t continue to insure the worker when the relationship ends.
An important extension to this model is to allow individuals to hold assets,
which would allow them to self insure. The inclusion of observable assets
would depart only slightly from the current version of the model but a more
realistic environment would allow workers to privately save. This creates many
interesting economic questions such as how do firms recruit among workers
with di erent asset holdings? In preliminary analysis of such an extension I
find that firms try to hire workers with higher assets because they are easier
to incentivize: firms can backload even more or get them to pay a bond,
improving retention. Upfront payment by the worker to the firm is observed
in high skill labour markets such as partnerships in law and consulting firms.
Another extension is to allow firms to counter outside o ers. Ine cient
poaching happens rarely in the estimated version of the model, but it would
be more realistic to have a mechanism by which firms could optimally decide
whether to counter outside o ers. This type of negotiations happen in practice
in high skills markets such as CEO and academics.
91
Chapter 3. Shocks and earnings Bibliography
Bibliography
Altonji, J., A. Smith, and I. Vidangos (2009): “Modeling earnings dy-
namics,” NBER.
Attanasio, O. P., and N. Pavoni (2011): “Risk sharing in private infor-
mation models with asset accumulation: Explaining the excess smoothness
of consumption,” Econometrica, 79(4), 1027–1068.
Azariadis, C. (1975): “Implicit contracts and underemployment equilibria,”
The Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1183–1202.
Baily, M. N. (1974): “Wages and employment under uncertain demand,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 41(1), 37–50.
Baragatti, M., A. Grimaud, and D. Pommeret (2011): “Parallel Tem-
pering with Equi-Energy Moves,” Arxiv preprint.
Benveniste, L., and J. Scheinkman (1979): “On the di erentiability of the
value function in dynamic models of economics,” Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, pp. 727–732.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Preston (2008): “Consumption in-
equality and partial insurance,” The American Economic Review, pp. 1887–
1921.
Burdett, K., and M. Coles (2003): “EquilibriumWage-Tenure Contracts,”
Econometrica, 71(5), 1377–1404.
Burdett, K., S. Shi, and R. Wright (2001): “Pricing and matching with
frictions,” Journal of Political Economy, 109(5), 1060–1085.
Chernozhukov, V., and H. Hong (2003): “An MCMC approach to classical
estimation,” Journal of Econometrics, 115(2), 293–346.
Cole, H., and F. Kubler (2012): “Recursive contracts, lotteries and weakly
concave pareto sets,” Review of Economic Dynamics.
92
Chapter 3. Shocks and earnings Bibliography
Dardanoni, V. (1995): “Income distribution dynamics: monotone Markov
chains make light work,” Social Choice and Welfare, 12(2), 181–192.
Das, S., and P. N. Suganthan (2011): “Di erential evolution: A survey
of the state-of-the-art,” Evolutionary Computation, IEEE Transactions on,
15(1), 4–31.
Guiso, L., L. Pistaferri, and F. Schivardi (2005): “Insurance within the
Firm.,” Journal of Political Economy, 113(5), 34.
Harris, M., and B. Holmstrom (1982): “A theory of wage dynamics,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 49(3), 315–333.
Hopenhayn, H., and J. Nicolini (1997): “Optimal unemployment insur-
ance,” Journal of political economy, 105(2), 412–438.
Knight, F. H. (1921): “Risk, uncertainty and profit,” New York: Hart,
Scha ner and Marx.
Kocherlakota, N. (1996): “Implications of e cient risk sharing without
commitment,” The Review of Economic Studies, 63(4), 595.
Koeppl, T. (2006): “Di erentiability of the e cient frontier when commit-
ment to risk sharing is limited,” Topics in Macroeconomics, 6(1), 1–6.
Lentz, R. (2013): “Optimal Wage-Tenure Contracts without Search Intensity
Commitment,” Working Paper.
Low, H., C. Meghir, and L. Pistaferri (2009): “Wage risk and employ-
ment risk over the life cycle,” NBER.
MaCurdy, T. E. (1982): “The use of time series processes to model the error
structure of earnings in a longitudinal data analysis,” Journal of economet-
rics, 18(1), 83–114.
Marcet, A., and R. Marimon (2011): “Recursive contracts,” Unpublished
Manuscript.
93
Chapter 3. Shocks and earnings Bibliography
Menzio, G., and S. Shi (2009): “E cient search on the job and the business
cycle,” Unpublished Manuscript.
(2010): “Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on
the job,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145(4), 1453–1494.
Messner, M., N. Pavoni, and C. Sleet (2011): “Recursive methods for
incentive problems,” Working Papers.
Moen, E. (1997): “Competitive search equilibrium,” Journal of Political
Economy, pp. 385–411.
Montgomery, J. (1991): “Equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry
wage di erentials,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1), 163–179.
Peters, M. (1991): “Ex ante price o ers in matching games non-steady
states,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp. 1425–1454.
Rogerson, W. P. (1985): “Repeated moral hazard,” Econometrica, pp. 69–
76.
Roys, N. (2011): “Persistence of Shocks, Employment and Wages,” Unpub-
lished Manuscript.
Rudanko, L. (2009): “Labor market dynamics under long-term wage con-
tracting,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(2), 170–183.
Schaal, E. (2010): “Uncertainty, Productivity and Unemployment during
the Great Recession,” unpublished, December.
Shi, S. (2009): “Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage–Tenure Contracts,”
Econometrica, 77(2), 561–584.
Shimer, R. (1996): “Contracts in a frictional labor market,” Discussion paper,
mimeo.
Shimer, R. (2001): “The assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with
coordination frictions,” NBER.
94
Chapter 3. Shocks and earnings 3.A. Data
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3.A Data
3.A.1 Auxiliary model
Recall the auxiliary model described in the first section of the paper. Note
that ”jt appears alone in the very first model, but is then decomposed into
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two di erent components when value added is introduced.
wijt = —Zt + w˜ijt + vijt
w˜ijt = w˜ijt≠1 + ”jt + ›ijt,
yjt = —Xt + y˜jt + ujt
y˜jt = y˜jt≠1 + µjt
”jt = ·µjt + ‹jt
The auxiliary model presented can be recovered from the following moments:
Ej
Ë
(Ei wijt)2
È
= ‡2” = ‡2‹ + ·2‡2µ (m1)
Eij
Ë
( wiit)2
È
= ‡2› + ‡2” + 2‡2v (m2)
Eij
Ë
( yit)2
È
= ‡2µ + 2‡2u (mw1)
Ej [ yjt · yjt≠1] = ≠‡2v (mw2)
Ej [ yijt · wijt] = ·‡2µ (mw2)
where Ei represents the expectation over co-workers within firm j.
3.B Proofs
3.B.1 Existence of the equilibrium
The model presented here is similar to the one presented in Menzio and Shi
(2010). The di erences are the composite functions r˜ and p˜ that now include
the e ort decision and the fact that workers are now heterogenous. This
means that I can apply their proof here as long as I can derive the necessary
properties on (p˜, r˜) and show that heterogeneity does not break any of the
Lipschitz bounds.
Lemma 17 (existence). A stationary competitive search equilibrium exists.
Definition 8. call J the set of functions J : X◊ Z◊ Væ R such that
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(a) J is strictly decreasing in V ,
(b) bi-Lipschitz continuous in V
(c) bounded
(d) concave
Lemma 19. The operator T defined in (BE-F) is self-mapping on J.
Proof of Lemma 17 . Consider a function J œ J and its image Jˆ = TJ .
We start by noting that the lottery gives us that Jˆ is concave which gives
continuity and almost everywhere di erentiability. Given that, we can ap-
ply the envelope theorem to find that the derivative of Jˆ is almost every-
where ≠1/uÕ(wú(x, y, V )). Given that we have established that the o ered
wage has to be bounded, it gives that the derivative of Jˆ is also bounded
in [≠1/u¯Õ,≠1/uÕ]. Given that V is itself bounded it gives us that Jˆ is also
bounded. The derivative is also strictly negative and so Jˆ is a one to one
mapping. Jˆ is then also bi-Lipschitz. That concludes the fact that Jˆ œ J.
Lemma 20. Bounds on p˜,r˜ [incomplete]
First I report a result from Menzio and Shi (2010) which applies directly here
and states that given Jn,Jr such that ||Jn ≠ Jr|| < ﬂ we have that ’x, v
Îp(◊(x, vú1n))≠ p(◊(x, vú1r))Î < –P (ﬂ) = max{2B¯P + pÕ(0)–◊ﬂ, 2–Rﬂ1/2}
Îp(◊(x, vú1n)) (vú1n ≠ v)≠ p(◊(x, vú1r)) (vú1r ≠ v)Î < –Rﬂ
that we need to use to show that it continues to apply when the e ort choice
of the worker is added. Given the policy for job search the e ort choice is
given by ” = e = cÕ≠1(p(◊(x, vú1n)) (vú1n ≠ v) + v ≠ U(x)) and so given that v
itself is bounded we find new bounds on the p˜ and r˜ functions:
Îr˜n ≠ r˜rÎ < –rﬂ
Îp˜n ≠ p˜rÎ < –P (ﬂ)
Lemma 21. The operator T is continuous on J
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Proof. This boils down to showing that T is K-lipschitz. Let’s take two
functions J1,J2 œ J and their respective image Jˆ1, Jˆ2. We already know
that they are part of J. Then we need to find a constant K such that
||Jˆ1 ≠ Jˆ2|| Æ K||J1 ≠ J2||. We substitute in the Jˆ1 and Jˆ2 by their defi-
nition. We then bound each element separately:
||Jˆ1(x, z, V )≠ Jˆ2(x, z, V )|| Æ ||u(w1)≠ u(w2)||
+ ||p˜1(x,W1)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,W1xÕzÕ)≠ p˜2(x,W2)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,W2xÕzÕ)||
where we now want to bound each term.
The rest of the proof follows identical steps to Tsuyuhara (2013) and Men-
zio and Shi (2010).
3.B.2 Properties or worker search functions
Lemma 22. Given (x,W ), vú(x,W ) and eú(W ) are uniquely determined,
p˜(x,W ) is continuous and decreasing, r˜(x,W ) is increasing inW , continuously
di erentiable and ˆr˜ˆW (x,W ) = —p˜(x,W ).
Proof. remember the definitions
vú(x,W ) = argmax
v
p(◊(x, v))(v ≠W )
eú(x,W ) = argmax
e
≠c(e) + ”(e)—EW0(xÕ)
+ —(1≠ ”(e)) (p(◊(x, vú))vú + —(1≠ ”(e))(1≠ p(◊(x, vú)))W ) ,
and the definition of the composite functions
p˜(x,W ) =(1≠ ”(eú(x,W ))) (1≠ p(◊(x, vú1(x,W ))))
r˜(x,W ) =≠ c(eú(x,W )) + —(1≠ ”(eú(x,W )))p(◊(x, vú1(x,W ))) (vú1(x,W )≠W )
+ ”(eú(x,W ))—ExÕ|xU(xÕ) + —(1≠ ”(eú(x,W )))(x,W )W
I first normalize ”(e) = 1 ≠ e ( or equivalently redefine c and e such that
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c(e) = c(”≠1(e))), where c(e) is increasing and concave. The maximization
problem for v gives the following first order condition
pÕ(◊(x, v))(v ≠W ) + p(◊(x, v)) = 0
where given the property of p and q and the equilibrium definition of ◊ we
have that the function v ‘æ p(◊(x, v)) is decreasing and strictly concave. This
gives that the maximum is unique and so vú(x,W ) is uniquely defined. The
first order condition for e is given by
cÕ(e) = —p(◊(x, vú1(x,W ))) (vú1(x,W )≠W ) + —W ≠ —ExÕ|xU(xÕ)
and given the assumption that c is strictly convex, we get that eú(x,W ) is also
uniquely defined.
Finally we can use the envelope condition to compute the derivative of r˜
with respect to W . By definition we have
r˜(x,W ) = sup
v,e
u(w)≠c(e)+(1≠e)—ExÕ|xW0(xÕ)+e—p(◊(x, v))v+e—(1≠p(◊(x, v)))W,
and so we get
ˆr˜
ˆW
(x,W ) = —eú(x,W )(1≠ p(◊(x, vú(x,W ))) = —p˜(x,W )
which proves that r˜ is continuously di erentiable as long as p˜ is continuous.
3.B.3 Regularity properties for equilibrium functions
Lemma 18. The Pareto frontier J (x, z, V ) is continuously di erentiable, de-
creasing and concave with respect to V and increasing in z.
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Proof of Lemma 18 . Consider the optimal contract equation:
J (x, z, V ) = sup
ﬁi,Wi,WixÕyÕ
ÿ
ﬁi
!
f(x, z)≠ wi + —p˜(x,Wi)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕyÕ)
"
s.t (⁄) 0 =
ÿ
i
ﬁi (u(wi) + r˜(x,Wi))≠ V,
(“i) 0 = Wi ≠ EWixÕyÕ ,ÿ
ﬁi = 1.
We already know that J is concave because of the two point lottery. That
tells us that it is continuous and di erentiable almost everywhere. Let’s then
show that it is di erentiable everywhere. I follow the steps of the derivation
presented in Koeppl (2006) where he shows that in the problem with two
sided limited commitment it is su cient to have one state realization where
neither participation constraint binds to achieve di erentiability of the Pareto
frontier. Given that the current problem is one sided the result works almost
right away, it just needs to be extended to include a search decision.
For a fixed s = (x, z), let’s consider a point V˜ where it’s not di eren-
tiable and call (w˜, ﬁ˜1, W˜ixÕzÕ , W˜i) the firm’s action at that point. This action
is by definition feasible and delivers v˜ to the worker. From that strategy I
am going to construct a continuum that delivers any V around V˜ . Keeping
(ﬁ˜1, W˜ixÕzÕ , W˜i) the same, I defined wú(V ) = u≠1(V ≠ V˜ ).
I then define the function J˜ (s, v) as the value that uses strategy1
wú(V ) = u≠1(V ≠ V˜ ), ﬁ˜1, W˜ixÕyÕ , W˜i
2
. It is the case that the strategy is fea-
sible since all constraints remain satisfied. By definition of J we have that
J˜ (s, V ) Æ J (s, V ) together with J˜ (s, V˜ ) = J(s, V˜ ). Finally because u(·) is
concave, increasing and twice di erentiable, J˜ (s, V˜ ) is also concave and twice
di erentiable.
We found a function concave, continuously di erentiable, lower than J
and equal to J at V˜ we can apply Lemma 1 from Benveniste and Scheinkman
(1979) which gives us that J (s, v) is di erentiable at v˜. We then conclude that
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J is di erentiable everywhere. Finally let’s show that J (x, z, v) is increasing
in z.
Let’s consider two di erent values z1 < z2. Call ›i the history contingent
policy starting at (x, zi, v). Policy ›1 will deliver identical utility to the worker
in all histories independently of whether it started at z1 or z2. I then compare
the value of using ›1 at (x, z1, v) and (x, z2, v). Given that the worker will be
promised the same utility in both cases and given that the process on x and
z are independent we can write the probability of each history ht as the the
product on the probability on the history on z and the probability on x
J (x, z, v|›1) =
ÿ
t
ÿ
(xt,zt)
—t
1
f(xt, zt)≠ wt
2
ﬁx,t(xt|x)ﬁz,t(zt|z)ﬁ”,t(›1),
where ﬁx,t is the productivity process on x generated by  x , ﬁz,t is the pro-
cess on z generated by g(z, ÿ), and ﬁ”,t(›1) is the composition of the leaving
probabilities p˜(xt,W t) prescribed by the policy ›1. We can then compare the
following di erence:
J (x, z2, v|›1)≠ J (x, z1, v|›1) =ÿ
t
ÿ
(xt,zt)
—tf(xt, zt)
1
ﬁz,t(zt|z2)≠ ﬁz,t(zt|z1)
2
ﬁx,t(xt|x)ﬁ”t(›1),
where we finally use the fact that the transition matrix on z is assumed to
be monotonic, in which case we get that all future distributions conditional
on z2 will stochastically dominate distributions conditional on z1. Given the
stochastic dominance of ﬁz,t(zt|z2) over ﬁz,t(zt|z2) and the monotonicity of
f(x, z) in z we get:
’t, xt ÿ
zt
f(xt, zt)
1
ﬁz,t(zt|z2)≠ ﬁz,t(zt|z1)
2
Ø 0
which gives the result. See Dardanoni (1995) for more on properties of mono-
tonic Markov chains.
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3.B.4 Characterization of the optimal contract
Lemma 23. For a given (x, z), a higher wage always means higher lifetime
utility.
Proof. This is a direct implication of the concavity of J and the envelope
condition:
ˆJ (x, z, v)
ˆv
= 1
uÕ(w) ,
and given also the concavity of u(·), we get that w and vs are always moving
in the same direction.
Theorem 2 (optimal contract). For each viable match (x, z), independent
of the lottery realization, the wage policy is characterized by a target wage
wú(x, z), which is increasing in z such that:
wt Æ wú(xt, zt) ∆ wt Æ wt+1 Æ wú(xt, zt) incentive to search less
wt Ø wú(xt, zt) ∆ wú(xt, zt) Æ wt+1 Æ wt incentive to search more
where the target wage is characterized by the zero expected profit condition for
the firm:
’x, z ExÕzÕ|xzJ (xÕ, zÕ,WxÕzÕ) = 0
Proof of Lemma 2 . We start again from the list of first order conditions and
we want to find a relationship for wage change.
J (x, z, V ) = sup
ﬁi,Wi,WixÕzÕ
ÿ
ﬁi
!
f(x, z)≠ wi + —p˜(x,Wi)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕzÕ)
"
s.t (⁄) 0 =
ÿ
i
ﬁi (u(wi) + r˜(x,Wi))≠ V,
(“i) 0 = Wi ≠ EWixÕzÕ ,ÿ
ﬁi = 1.
From the envelope theorem and the f.o.c. for the wage, we get that the wage
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in the current period is given by
i = 1, 2 uÕ(wi) =
1
⁄
= ≠
3
ˆJ
ˆv
(x, z, v)
4≠1
.
Now that also means that the wage next period in state (xÕ, zÕ) will be given
by
1
uÕ(wixÕzÕ)
= ≠ˆJ
ˆv
(xÕ, zÕ,WixÕzÕ).
I then look at the first order condition with respect to Wi
ﬁi—p˜v(x,Wi)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕyÕ) + —⁄ﬁirÕ(x,Wi) + ﬁi“i = 0,
where I substitute rÕ(x,W ) = p˜(x,W ), derived in Lemma (3.B.2):
ﬁi—p˜v(x,Wi)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕyÕ) + —⁄ﬁip˜(x,Wi) + ﬁi“i = 0.
Using the f.o.c. for WixÕzÕ , which is
—p˜(x,Wi)
ˆJ
ˆv
(xÕ, zÕ,WixÕyÕ)≠ “i = 0,
I get the following expression:
ﬁi—p˜v(x,Wi)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕzÕ)+—⁄ﬁip˜(x,Wi)+ﬁi—p˜(x,Wi)ˆJˆv (x
Õ, zÕ,WixÕzÕ) = 0.
Focusing on p1(x,W ) > 0 and ﬁi > 0 since otherwise, the worker is leaving
the current firm and the next period wage is irrelevant, we first rewrite:
p˜v(x,Wi)
p˜(x,Wi)
EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕzÕ) + ⁄+ ˆJˆv (s
Õ, vsÕ) = 0.
I finally use the envelope condition to extract the wage next period from the
last term on the right
p˜v(x,Wi)
p˜(x,Wi)
EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕzÕ) = 1uÕ(wxÕzÕ) ≠
1
uÕ(w) ,
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where since p˜v(x,Wi) > 0 the inverse marginal utility and consequently wages
move according to the sign of expected surplus to the firm. This shows that
within each realization of the lottery, the wage will move according to expected
profit.
Randomizing over increase and decrease: the next step is to inves-
tigate if it is ever optimal for the firm to randomize over a wage increase and
a wage decrease at the same time. If the lottery is degenerate then the result
holds directly. We are left with non-degenerate lotteries. In that case the first
order condition with respect to ﬁ must be equal to zero (otherwise we are at
a corner solution, which is degenerate). Taking the first order condition with
respect to ﬁ gives:
—p˜(x,W1)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,W1xÕzÕ)+⁄—r˜(x,W1) = —p˜(x,W2)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,W2xÕzÕ)+⁄—r˜(x,W2),
which we can reorder in
—p˜(x,W1)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,W1xÕzÕ)≠—p˜(x,W2)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,W2xÕyzÕ) = ⁄— (r˜(x,W2)≠ r˜(x,W1)) .
Now, suppose that the randomization is over two expected profits of opposite
sign for the firm where 1 is positive and 2 is negative. The left hand side is
then positive. But in that case we know that W2 < V < W1 because higher
wages give higher utilities in all states of the world, and so they do so also in
expectation. This gives us that r˜(x,W2) < r˜(x,W1). Given that ⁄ is equal to
inverse marginal utility it is positive. But then the right hand side is negative,
so we have a contradiction. So independent of the randomization, the wage
will move according to the sign of the expected profit.
Monotonicity in z: the final step is to show that the e ciency wage
is increasing in z. We already know that J (x, z, V ) is increasing in z and
decreasing and concave in V . Let’s consider z1 < z2 and associated e ciency
wage wú(x, z1). We want to show that wú(x, z1) < wú(x, z2). Call ›1 the
optimal policy starting at state J (x, z1, V1) where V1 delivers wú(x, z1) and
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using ›1 at (x, z2), the worker receives V1 and is paid wú(x, z1). The firm
makes more profit than at z1 since f(x, z) is increasing in z and EJ is larger
as well. The optimal policy at (x, z2, V1) will pay a higher wage than wú(x, z1)
to trade some output for a longer expected lifespan, but continue to choose
positive EJ . So we found a wage wú3 Ø wú(x, z1) such that EJ is still positive.
This last point implies that wú3 Æ wú(x, z2) and concludes.
3.B.5 From matching function to tightness
I use the following matching function
p(◊) = ◊‹
q(◊) = p(◊)/◊ = ◊‹≠1
this gives us that
p = q
‹
‹≠1 ,
and we have the following equilibrium equality for q(·) from the free entry
condition:
we end up with
p(x, v) =
3 1
ke
J(x, y, z, v)
4 ‹
1≠‹
.
Now since I am worried about keeping this function su ciently concave to
insure uniqueness of the worker search decision, I use ‹ < 1/2.
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3.B.6 Recursive Lagrangian formulation
Ignoring the lottery for now, we have the following recursive formulation for
J
J (x, z, V ) = sup
ﬁi,Wi,WixÕyÕ
f(x, z)≠ wi + —p˜(x,Wi)EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WixÕyÕ)
s.t (⁄) 0 = u(wi) + r˜(x,Wi)≠ V,
(“i) 0 = Wi ≠ EWixÕzÕ .
From which we can construct the Pareto problem
P(x, z, ﬂ) = sup
v
J (x, z, v) + ﬂv.
Formally, P is also the Legendre–Fenchel transform of P, see Villani (2003).
We seek a recursive formulation. I first substitute the definition of J and the
constraint on ⁄ in P to get
P(x, z, ﬂ) = sup
V,w,W,WxÕzÕ
f(x, z)≠ w + —p˜(x,W )EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WxÕzÕ) + ﬂV
s.t (⁄) 0 = u(wi) + r˜(x,W )≠ V,
(“) 0 = W ≠ EWxÕzÕ .
at which point I can substitute in the V constraint:
P(x, z, ﬂ) = sup
V,w,W,WxÕzÕ
f(x, z)≠ w + —p˜(x,W )EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WxÕzÕ) + ﬂ (u(wi) + r˜(x,W ))
s.t (“) 0 = W ≠ EWxÕzÕ .
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then I append the constraint (“)with weight —“p˜(x,W )
P(x, z, ﬂ) = inf
“
sup
V,w,W,WxÕzÕ
f(x, z)≠ w + ﬂ (u(wi) + r˜(x,W ))
≠“—p˜(x,W )(W ≠ EWxÕzÕ)
+—p˜(x,W )EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WxÕzÕ)
which finally we recombine as
P(x, z, ﬂ) = inf
“
sup
V,w,W,WxÕzÕ
f(x, z)≠ w + ﬂ (u(wi) + r˜(x,W ))
≠—“p˜(x,W )
+—p˜(x,W )EJ (xÕ, zÕ,WxÕzÕ) + “EWxÕzÕ
the final step is to move the sup to the right hand side to get:
P(x, z, ﬂ) = inf
“
sup
w,W
f(x, z)≠ w + ﬂ (u(wi) + r˜(x,W ))
≠—“p˜(x,W )
+—p˜(x,W )E
C
sup
WxÕzÕ
J (xÕ, zÕ,WxÕzÕ) + “WxÕzÕ
D
where we recognize the expression for P and so we are left with solving the
following saddle point functional equation (SPFE):
P(x, z, ﬂ) = inf
“
sup
w,W
f(x, z)≠ w + ﬂ (u(wi) + r˜(x,W ))
≠ —“p˜(x,W ) + —p˜(x,W )EP(xÕ, zÕ, “). (SPFE)
From the solution of this equation we can reconstruct the lifetime utility
of the worker, and the profit function of the firm
V(x, z, ﬂ) = ˆP
ˆﬂ
(c, z, ﬂ)
J (x, z, v) = P(x, z, ﬂú(x, z, v))≠ ﬂú(x, z, v) · v.
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3.B.7 Notations
Here is a summary of the notations used in the paper:
— is discount factor
u : Ræ R is utility function
c : Ræ R is e ort function
e is e ort level of the worker
w is wage
x is worker productivity
z is match productivity
f(x, z) is output of worker x in match z
Ÿ is search e ciency on the job
÷ is vacancy cost
◊ is market tightness for market (x, v)
v is value a worker will get in a given submarket
V is value promised to the worker when entering a period
Wi is expected value promised to the worker in realization i of the lottery
WxÕzÕ is value promised to the worker in realization (xÕ, zÕ) of the shock
v1(x, z, v) is the search policy of the worker
e(x, z, v) is the e ort policy of the worker
3.C Additional Data information
3.D Model extensions
3.D.1 severance payments
I present here an extended version of the model with side payments when the
worker loses his job. The firm is allowed to choose a value g delivered to the
worker when he moves to unemployment.
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Construction etc. Manufacturing Retail trade Services
educ1
‡f 0.00498 0.00365 0.00298 0.00471
(0.000336) (0.000151) (0.000215) (0.000376)
‡w 0.0245 0.0212 0.0197 0.0279
(0.00297) (0.00107) (0.00176) (0.00228)
firm perc 16.9 14.7 13.2 14.5
educ2
‡f 0.0059 0.00321 0.00431 0.00481
(0.000434) (0.000164) (0.000401) (0.000509)
‡w 0.024 0.0185 0.02 0.0254
(0.00302) (0.00125) (0.00269) (0.00334)
firm perc 19.8 14.8 17.7 15.9
educ3
‡f 0.00558 0.00225 0.00521 0.00757
(0.000768) (0.000122) (0.000547) (0.000299)
‡w 0.0267 0.0187 0.0224 0.0231
(0.00342) (0.00124) (0.00328) (0.00173)
firm perc 17.3 10.7 18.9 24.6
Table 3.9: Uncertainty at firm level per industry and education group
I start from the recursive form and
f(s)≠ w ≠ g(1≠ q) + —p1(e, g)EJ(sÕ, vsÕ)+
ﬂ (u(w) + r(e, g))≠ µ—p1(e, g)(e≠ EvsÕ)
where
r(e, g) = sup
v,q
≠c(q) + (1≠ q)—EU(xÕ, g) + q—p(v)v + q(1≠ p(v))—e.
and so we get
re(e) = ≠qú—(1≠ pú) = ≠—p1(e)
rg(e) = (1≠ qú)—EUg(xÕ, g)
which we can recombine in
f(s)≠ w + ﬂ(u(w) + r(e))≠ µ—p1(e)e+ —p1(e)EP (sÕ, µ)
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and we get 3 FOC: w µ and e and g
e = EPﬂ(s, µ)
≠ﬂre(e)≠ µ—pe(e, g)e≠ µpe(e, g) + —pe(e, g)EP (sÕ, µ) = 0
≠(1≠ q) + ﬂrg ≠ µ—pge+ —pgEP = 0
I should combine the terms in pÕ(e) to get EP ≠ (ﬂ+ µ)e
(µ≠ ﬂ)p1(e) = —pÕ1(e)E 1(sÕ, µ)
and we can recombine the equation in g to find the optimal severance package:
(1≠ q)(— EUg¸˚˙˝
<0
≠1) = ≠ —pg1≠ qE 1
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